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
TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS
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
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
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TRANSLATIONS ON EASTERN EUROPE

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1430

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

INTERNATIONALISM IS KEY TO SOCIALIST FOREIGN POLICY

Budapest KULPOLITIKA in Hungarian No 2, 1977 pp 108-117

[Article by Dr Gyula Bognar, editor-in-chief of KULPOLITIKA: "Internationalism and Socialist Foreign Policy"]

[Text] In the ideological struggles of our times, debate has flared up again around many, once-clarified issues. Forgotten principles frequently come to life again primarily because the soil exists — petit bourgeois life. Naturally, more direct causes also play a role like, for example, changes in the conditions of the world-wide class struggle, or the fact that new masses, new generations are constantly joining in the social struggles which have not as yet acquired the necessary historical experience. We must always reckon with these circumstances, which make necessary the analysis of new phenomena, a study of class struggle experiences, their generalization, and their comparison with earlier experiences. This cannot be dispensed with even when it is ideologically obvious this or that position or concept is erroneous, damagaing or inimical. A sheer rejection without analysis and discussion is not enough.

The foregoing might apply to a good number of timely, ideological problems. The national and international requirements of the class struggle, the national and international aspects of socialist building, the dialectics of the world-wide revolutionary process, the relationship particularly to the socialist world, to the Soviet Union and its international content and role are problems in the current ideological struggle to which history once gave an answer but which are again emerging from definite, concrete circumstances.

There is not a political current or organization which wants to be regarded as a part of the international communist movement but would at the same time oppose internationalism. A debate, however, is being waged over the interpretation of the present substance and function of internationalism. In various places, they have formed views that there is an essential variation between the former and present function of internationalism. Internationalism is, on one hand, a theoretical, world-outlook problem; and, on the other hand, it is manifested in practice and solidarity. Differences of view, therefore, developing in international problems are not limited to the theoretical sphere, but frequently they are directly linked to the politics of the day. Naturally, they rather affect socialist foreign policy. Below, we shall try to approach several timely implications of internationalism from the aspect of national and international interests manifesting themselves in socialist foreign policy.

The Unchanged Importance of a Class Outlook

The development of labor's consciousness together with capitalism, the organized defense and weighing of its interests lead us to where the individual is identified with an increasingly greater community. First the workers in a workshop and then the trades unite, and then a political movement organized in a national framework is born, and finally the international unity of national movements.

The international outlook on political processes and the practical requirements of internationalism appear together in the communist movement. Marx and Engels precisely defined the place of national and international elements and features, the role of the working class in the struggle. One of the basic conditions of the Communist Manifesto is "if not in substance but in form the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is at the beginning national. The proletariat of every single nation must naturally reckon at first with its own bourgeoisie."1 The further development, the logical fulfillment of this struggle gave birth to the slogan "Workers of the World, Unite!" which has remained the most compact conceptualization of the essence of internationalism. Hence, internationalism in both of its above meanings — as a basic principle and practical solidarity — unfolded during the development of the class struggle, as an objective characteristic feature of social struggles. No matter how consistent and direct is the growth of the class struggle into the international sphere, the national sphere does not come to an end, nor does its role become reduced. In this respect, the Communist Manifesto not only points out that the national phase has a concreteand important role in the class struggle but looking ahead to the main task related to the seizing of political power, it establishes that the proletariat "must raise itself into a national class, organize itself into a national class, and therefore is itself still national, but in no event in a bourgeois sense."2

This nuanced, balanced theorem has been frequently distorted. We can find frequent examples in Hungarian history of where an exaggeration of the national phase in social processes can lead, but a no less serious problem is posed by the outlook which regarded the national phase as some kind of evil to be endured, a temporarily valid compromise, or did not sense the real substance of the category.

The nation, or the interest of the nations, is not eternal; its substance changes, like that of any other social category. The interest of the ruling class is at all times expressed in the national interest. It is the task of the socialist states to represent the interests of the worker class, or the working classes. Hence the socialist national interest can be found, its content conceived, and its manifestations in politics can be directly observed, for it is one of the moving forces of economic and social processes. It is, therefore, truly a national interest, but it has a socialist content which varies from that of the capitalist nations. The socialist national interest, in a certain sense, is undoubtedly a continuation of the prerevolutionary national interest; but most essential, it is expressly the opposite in respect

to the class content related to the social order, and it must free itself from the influences and impressions of national interest formed by the exploiters.

Among the factors which call socialist national interests to life we find some of a nature which exert a more or less unchanged effect on the period following socialist revolution (for example, the mangitude of a country's area and population, its raw material supplies, and the external determinants of the national production process), but the majority of the factors, in their totality, derive from the social system (the country's position in the system of socialist states; the economic, technical, scientific potential; the consolidation, maturity, etc. of the new social system).³

The socialist national interest expresses the interest of the overwhelming majority of society, and in this sense its national character is fuller and more exact than its predecessor's. At the same time, it undertakes and represents the future merging and associating trend of nations, and it seeks to realize national interest in an international way. That the interest of a socialist nation is, in part, "more national" than of its capitalist predecessor and at the same time prepares the future merging of nations is a contradiction which derives from the essence and nature of the matter. impossible to represent any nation's true interest other than by recognizing and taking into account the interest of other nations as well, that is, in an internationalist manner. Internationalization is an objective process, which unfolded parallel with capitalist economic development, received a new impulse in socialism, and today pervades all spheres of social life. The importance of international relations has grown immeasurably. Realization of national interests can be realistically conceived only in the framework of a great international relation system signifying mutual dependence.

Recognition of perspectives for the merging of nations does not at all require limiting the national interest; but on the contrary, the many-sided development of the workers who make up the nations. The key to the solution of the contradiction is that whether we study the interest relations on the national or international plane, the interest in question of the working class and other workers is in essential agreement. The class character, therefore, plays a key role in the relation of national and international interests.

Prior to the seizure of power, national policy did not represent the interests of the working class and other workers, and in fact in the most essential problems they were diametrically opposed. The workers' interest required that they should reject the "official" national policy, because it expressed the interests of the oppressor classes, the exploitors. The working class, generally, was not against what was "national" but against the bourgeois interests that appeared as national, but still the capitalist class branded it as antinational.

After the seizure of power, the possibility arose for national policy to develop, in every concrete question, into a policy expressing the interests of the greater part of the nation. But the transformation is not simple. It cannot be achieved with one blow that national policy should in fact reflect the class interest of the workers, and to reflect only that and nothing else that is

alien thereto. In the course of development, these interests must be conceived over and over again in every new question brought on the agenda by life.

Experiences show that the exact identification, conceptualization, or representation of interests can be realized only through regularly necessary corrections. In the foreign policies of the European socialist countries, the relations that tied them together were made difficult by a troubled and contradictory bourgeois heritage. Today, harmony is not automatically created on socialist ground either. Time and again, interests conceived in a bourgeois class soil, that is, false interests, are given expression - particularly in certain branches of science and the arts - which socialist interest research, recently come alive, has named as an incorrectly recognized interest, quasi-interest or pseudo-interest. We can agree with the statement that at the present state of its development, socialism does not differ from other societies in its possibilities for developing a certain type of pseudointerests."4 A sharp difference between the national interest studied within the country and the nature of interests appearing on the international plane cannot be imagined. Between interests that appear internationally and national interests in the internal sense, there must be a close tie. On basis of this, it is obvious that the pseudo-interest will sometimes also have an effect internationally. This naturally can complicate the harmonization of any socialist country's national interest with that of the others, or with international interest.

Not long ago, bourgeois literature on international problems conspicuously belittled and branded as obsolete the national plane, the nationalism effect. But all this was quickly changed. Bourgeois authors now write of nationalism as some kind of mystical regeneration, and arrive from there to the conclusion that communism is disintegrating. For example, Langwall directly gave this title to his book: "Nationalism as the Final Phase of Communism."

In a certain sense, nationalism is stirring around the world. A detailed research in the causes of this phenomenon would exceed the limits of this work, but it can be stated that the explanation does not lie in the revival of enemy propaganda, although this cannot be ignored. Bourgeois propaganda has always sought to show centrifugal trends among socialist countries. The different sorts of opportunism have also exerted an effect in this direction. Theories on superpowers and the increasing role of the small and medium states divert attention from the difference in the capitalist and socialist class content, and weaken the class outlook. All this can strengthen nationalist trends.

We cannot leave out of account political errors and distortions. For example, the effect of that earlier outlook which at the most merely "tolerated" the national phase in socialist building has not passed, and it has not taken account of the concrete consequences thereof. It is more important, however, that certain people are trying to use this exposed and eliminated error as a pretext in overemphasizing the role of the national element.

Later, we shall return to the coordination of national interests, which becomes possible among socialist states, but is not realized automatically. Possible errors here, too, may be directly related with nationalist phenomena.

Comparing everything, it is obvious that in socialism the progressive objective social and economic processes do not point toward nationalism. We can observe exactly the opposite process of internationalization. The objective unfolding of the international interrelations of socialist development make the struggle against the manifestations of nationalist ideology particularly important, justified, and well founded.

In the period of peaceful coexistence, or the development of detente, the rigid, dividing role of national boundaries is reduced, but the importance of the exact delineation of ideological "borders" and their consistent defense does not decline, and in fact it increases.

Clarification of national interests from pseudo-interests is not dispensable, for otherwise the basic interrelationship is distorted, namely, that the common class content is primarily expressed both in national and international interests. The solution to this task is very delicate and difficult. National interests are defined by sovereign states, and represented in their policies. The identity of the ideologies of socialist states and of their main goals makes it possible to discover the interest problems and correct them, but there is no kind of international automatism which would perform this, since the carrier of the interest interrelationship in question is the sovereign national state. Naturally, scientific research and the discovery of interest relations can help policy a great deal in this area, assuming that the demand exists for its use. An important role can be played by the common institutions of the socialist countries, which can express the objectively existing but not adequately identified or appropriately represented interests, and with this they can indirectly correct subjective pseudo-interests, or their effects.

This correction of the two layers of the socialist interest structure — the national and the international — affects only a small part of the problems on the cutting surface. The coordination of interests would be simpler if only the false interests caused the problems. The international coordination of interests is a constant task called on to coordinate actual national interests, on one hand, with the other socialist national interests, and, on the other hand, with international socialist interests.

It is obvious that with the exact identification and coordination of interest relations among the socialist countries, the Warsaw Treaty Organization and CEMA have an increasing role. In the economic area, the proliferating mechanism of coordination has been for long operating in the form of the CEMA Secretariat and various committees. A decision was passed at the November 1976 meeting in Bucharest of the Political Consultative Commission [PTT] of the Warsaw Organization concerning the establishment of the Committee of Foreign Ministries and the United Secretariat of the Warsaw Organization PTT. These measures have created very important forums for the coordination of interests and positions in the political area. As a result of

the closer, more organized cooperation of the equal, sovereign socialist states, the individually and collectively represented coordinated position reflects more exactly the common class basis, the common goals, and principles. This can be promoted by the international organizations and organs of the socialist countries by way of taking into account national interests, identifying international interests, approaching national and international interests, and the conscious solving of possible problems that exist among themselves.

The International Interests of Socialism

Captalism gave an international character to economics, and invested the capital-work antithesis with an international dimension. The capitalists, as a social class with internationally identical features, obviously have international interests. They do generally not recognize this, and in fact they directly deny it, although in recent times the requirement of a common capitalist stance against socialism, as a capitalist international interest, appears more and more frequently in literature. For the most part, however, they represent their class interests as some kind of harmonious national interest; and in an international respect, they proceed basically from the confrontation of national interests. Bourgeois literature does not regard it as possible, in the international relations within the socialist world, for common, international interests to develop. According to Morgenthau, only national interest is real, while international interests have no content in reality. Many bourgeois authors try to present the international interests of socialist countries as the effect of some kind of "super-power" force, or the special interest of the Soviet Union. History itself belies such an anti-Soviet distortion. Since the establishment of the Soviet Union, the fate of the first workers' state and of socialism was welded together. Naturally, the Soviet Union, too, has its own interests, like any other state, but internationalism was always expressed in its policies. Its own interests were never in opposition with internationalism, because the Soviet Union always proceeded from the viewpoint that support for the international revolutionary movement was at the same time in the interest of the Soviet Union. Internationalism and solidarity are, to be sure, not quantifiable concepts, but we still note that the world's first and most powerful socialist country has given to a greater extent than it has received through the channels of internationalism. If for no other reason, its is untenable to represent the international interests of socialism as some kind of Soviet pressure.

Today there is a rather extensive socialist literature in study of the relations between the national and international interests of socialism. The authors generally agree that the appearance of the class essence of socialism is an international interest, and therefore an expression of that commonalty which is primarily socialist, independent of national differences and variations of forms. We could also put it this way that the realization of the common regularity of socialism is a socialist interest of a primary and international nature. In political practice, it is worthwhile to keep in mind the relationship that by its essence and by the attained level of socialization,

socialism is of necessity a society of an international nature. This means that in the development of its organizational forms and limits and the planning of its national development, the requirements of internationalization unfolding the production and other spheres of social existence must be met. This is how adjustment to the recognized social laws is realized.

The old charge that socialism as realized wants to export revolution, and at "bayonet point," is rarely brought up today. It is well known that the socialist world is striving for peace, and it is also obvious that the enormous tasks of socialist building cannot be otherwise realized than with the active cooperation of the broadest masses, and this cannot be done with bayonets. The people of the socialist countries are still directly interested in the success of revolutionary movements of other people. International proletarian solidarity, of course, does not become obsolete when the revolution is victorious in a number of countries. The forms of solidarity change, the means and the active community undertakings remain the same.

Interests of a direct, material nature cannot be neglected in policy, but this alone does not determine what is to be done, whether we consider the person or class. Willingness to sacrifice for others is natural to the morale of a healthy man.

In the final case, capitalism is always ready to extend help across national boundaries to fight the revolutionary movement. Nobody can dispute this right of a working class that has come to Power. The maintenance of international proletarian solidarity is in the interest of the working class.

The international interest of the working class includes the defense of the socialist achievements of workers who have come to power. The people of every socialist country and the working class of other countries are interested in this. This interest, therefore, is linked to socialist achievements in which the class content of socialist power is expressed, that is, whatever is common and at the same time the most important. In November 1968, on the fiftieth ammiversary of the founding of the Hungarian Communist Party, Janos Kadar stated in his speech before the Central Committee that for the worthy building of socialism we need "a solid workers' power, the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party, the realization in the party of the principles of democratic centralism, public ownership of production means, the organizing role of the socialist state, socialist plan management, socialist public education, culture, socialist public thinking, and international cooperation with the other socialist countries."5

Without doubt, those countries where these criteria are met are socialist countries. We may speak essentially in two relations of their common international interests. On one hand, the national realization or promotion of a certain goal is the separate interest of every individual socialist country. In this sense, the international interest is the sum of national interests. We frequently have to do with an international interest so structured; for example, the interest of the socialist countries in protecting world peace is structured like this.

Most of the socialist countries are separately, individually interested in the economy, for example, in developing the work-intensive branches, as opposed to the material-intensive ones. Every socialist country is also interested in the growth of capitalist export. In such cases, national interests with identical goals may intersect; of themselves, they do not integrate into a harmonious, common interest. Therefore, if we approach such international interests exclusively from the aspect of national interest, we can easily find ourselves in a blind alley, and the coordination of interests will run into difficulties. We need a complex approach, which will include, naturally, the identification, study of national interests, but will not rest or be satisfied there.

Naturally, socialist building is a prime task in every socialist country. This is a national task, or international at the same time. Lenin defined as the requirements of internationalism that they should do "the minimum of that which in one country can be realized for the development, support and awakening of its revolution in all countries."

Lenin's guidance for the solution of socialist tasks emphasizes its effect on the international arena of the struggle, but it does not simply identify the solution of national tasks with international obligations. Otherwise, even in the solution to the most narrowly interpreted national tasks we cannot disregard international conditions. The basic condition to the solution of national economic tasks is the taking into account of the various forms of international economic relations, the conscious undertaking of the internationalization of production, and the interests of others.

On Internationalization

Realization of the national interests of socialist countries is increasingly bound to certain international conditions. Marxism-Leninism studies social development on the basis of objective laws, which in final analysis are rooted in production. The increase in internationalization is a phenomenon that grows from the economic reality of society, to which the Marxist-Leninist classics have attributed exceptional importance. "The entire economic, political and intellectual life of mankind is becoming internationalized in capitalism, too," wrote Lenin. "Socialism internationalizes it entirely."7

The basis of political and intellectual internationalization is the internationalization of production. This process is also characteristic already of the production forces of capitalism, particularly in the period of imperialism. It is natural that under the relations of a capitalist order, this process assumes a capitalist form, that is, it leads to contradictions, to the intensification of exploitation.

The historical mission of socialism is to remove from the path of the further development of mankind the hindrances deriving from capitalist relations. In the development of production forces, this means the increase of internationalization by way of rejecting capitalist forms, creating and constantly perfecting new, socialist forms.

We can weigh the serious consequences of the capitalist internationalization of production, for example, with the internal problems of the leading capitalist states or in the relations between the developed capitalist countries and the developing countries. Serious crises are shaking capitalism's system of international economic relations. Not even at the cost of greatest efforts can the developed capitalist world free itself of permanent crisis phenomena. The former colonies, which are still forced to live under economic relations developed by capitalism, strongly demand the transformation of the entire capitalist international economic relations system. The demand for a so-called new economic world system is essentially a reflection of the profound crisis of capitalist international economic relations. A radical solution, here too, can only be brought by the creation of socialist—type relations, although with the resolute unity of the developing countries and the socialist world, progress could be made even under present conditions in easing to a certain degree the most serious consequences deriving from the essence of capitalism.

Experiences show that in developing international economic ties based on mutual advantages, equal rights and constructive cooperation, the hisotrical role of initiative belongs to socialism. The process of the internationalization of production — which has advanced on capitalist ground to be sure, but has given birth to serious crises and exploitative relations — can be free of contradictions and develop truly only in socialism.

The scientific-technical revolution requires the development of the appropriate framework for the unfolding of internationalization. The development of large serial production, the growth of investment demand, the use of sciences as production forces lead to where the social processes of recreation being undergone in individual countries are constantly more dependent on the world economy and the technical world level.

Socialism is creating the possibilities for fulfilling these requirements, but these by themselves do not lead to a solution. O. T. Bogomolov points out:
"The need to intensify and deepen the manifold cooperation of socialist countries frequently runs into the contradiction of forms, which they did not make adequately suitable to a common working out and realization of resolutions... This contradiction can be explained partly by the fact that there is no adequate experience in international cooperation conducted on socialist bases...There is considerable difficulty in working out the new forms of international contact, it is their mission — to quote Lenin — to assure the meeting of national requirements and interests in international unty...The sum of organizational forms and methods establishes the mechanism of mutual relations, on the smooth operation of which depends, to no small degree, the common and particular interests of the countries, the consistent, practical realization of the principles of socialist internationalism."

Since there are no obstacles in principle or substance for solving the contradictions, everything depends on the methods and the appropriate forms whether an internationalism foreign policy aimed at solving the contradictions will be realized.

Every inner trend of the socialist world system affects the foreign policy of socialist countries, where the subject base of decision and action is the sovereign socialist state. There is not a single organization in the socialist world system where it is possible — as opposed to corresponding organizations in the capitalist world — where it is possible on the basis of majority decision for the soveriegn subject base, the socialist state, to be forced into a measure at variance with its own thinking and opinion.

A number of the communist and workers' parties which lead the socialist states recently held congresses. The reports and resolutions bear witness that the parties judge in the same or similar way the role of cooperation being realized in the socialist world system and the tasks of socialist foreign policy in the present historical phase.

The program statement approved at the Eleventh Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party makes it clear that "the socialist world system is the force which is the main guarantee for the progress of all mankind and for the independence and prosperity of our country," and also states that the cooperation developing in the socialist community "brings the peoples building the new society closer and closer together."9

L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party: "In the foreign relations developed with the socialist states, the Soviet Communist Party holds itself to the tried principles — it proceeds in the spirit of equal rights and interest in mutual successes, and in working out decisions it bears in mind not only national but internationalist interests. "10

In our era, internationalism is a key problem for the forces of socialism. The concrete substance, the forms and the methods change, as the class struggle develops and is enhanced, but its importance and role remain unchanged, for with the ties of solidarity it hammers these forces together and represents a resource that cannot be replaced by another. The idea of proletarian internationalism, according to Janos Kadar, "includes the coordination of national and international interests," which in the present situation is one of the most important components of the further development of the socialist world system. 11

FOOTNOTES

- 1. Marx-Engels "Works," vol 4, Budapest 1959, p 451.
- 2. Ibid. p 457.
- 3. L. Dujinski "Coordination of the International and National Interests of Socialist Countries. Socialism and the Nations," Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1976, p. 377.

- 4. Jozsef Lick "The Concept of Interest and Its Social Definition," TARSADALMI SZEMLE, 1976, No 10, p 73.
- 5. Janos Kadar "International, National Interest," Magveto Kiado, 1976, p 195.
- 6. Lenin "Selected Works" vol 2, Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1967, p 438.
- 7. Lenin "Complete Works" vol 22, Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1969, p 317.
- 8. "Socialism and the Nations," Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1976, p 92.
- 9. "Protocol of the Eleventh Congress of the MSZMP," Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1975, pp 521-522.
- 10. "Twenty-fifth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party," Kossuth Konyvki-ado, 1976, p 10.
- 11. "Berlin Conference of the European Communist and Workers' Parties," Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1976, p 236.

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-CZECHOSLOVAKIA

'TRIBUNA' ATTACKS EUROCOMMUNISM, CARRILLO

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech Issue 27 6 Jul 77 pp 1, 11 AU

[Article by Frantisek Kurna: "A Year Ago in Berlin"]

[Excerpts] The conference of European communist and workers parties held in Berlin a year ago has evoked not only great interest and approval, but also irritation, anger, and efforts through various speculations to disparage its results.

In this hostile spirit, voices have been heard from reformist and rightist opportunist elements who fear the activity of the masses and who are trying to influence the working people through suggestion to become passive toward imperialist oppression, the threat of fascism, and the danger of war, as well as from little extreme leftist groups tenaciously claiming that to fight for peace means moving away from socialism and betraying the revolutionary ideals.

The Maoists, like the rightist opportunists of all hues or the capitalists, have found also a common antiprogress and anticommunist platform: anti-Sovietism, and the bogeyman of some sort of imagined "Soviet threat." Some are intimidating their population by saying that Soviet tanks are on the verge of "rolling over" their countries. In order to give this—to us an absurd—assertion authority, they organize public controversies among their generals as to whether this is going to happen within 2 or 8 days! And others call on their population to dig underground shelters, to put entire cities underground, because the Soviet attack is "imminent," world war unavoidable....

All this was here previously—in different forms. On the other hand, under the smoke screen of a "Soviet danger," one was always preparing an attack against progressive forces, socialism and the Soviet Union. With the rise of the socialist community, a new type of interstate relations of cooperation and assistance, called "socialist internationalism," has been created among its member states. This, however, is the same proletarian internationalism which is being implemented in the socialist countries' specific conditions.

The class enemy has always waged a concentrated attack against internationalism, for he has become convinced from the many joint actions of the inter-

national revolutionary movement, as well as from the struggle of the proletariat in the individual countries, that with the growth of the revolutionary forces' unity their strength, action-capability, and the possibility of victory multiplies.

Even today this is no different. Time and again they shout their hackneyed phrases about the "hands of Moscow," "dictate of Moscow," about internationalism, allegedly meaning forcing the Soviet model upon other countries, and similar nonsense.

Every person who has become even a little acquainted with Marxism knows that, for example, Lenin expressed the hypothesis that world revolution need not develop in the way it seemed [it had to] in the period immediately before and after the Great October Socialist Revolution. Even then, Lenin admitted the possibility of that which he later called the "transition from attack to seige."

It is also known that Lenin, already in his "Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," emphasized the necessity of a creative approach and course on the basis of respecting the wide variety of conditions, while of course observing the fundamental principles of communism, which would be "correctly adapted to the nationality and nationality-state [narodnostne statnim] differences."

What do they actually have in mind, these bourgeois politicians who are showing such a touching concern for the independence of the various revolutionary detachments "from Moscow," when absolute independence has already existed for a long time? The bourgeois politicians are striving for nothing more and nothing less than to separate [vydelity] individual parties from the united front of the class struggle, the struggle for progress, and to achieve, by stressing nationalist viewpoints, the parties' gradual abandonment of the general principles of Marxism-Leninism, of the revolutionary path, and that particularly in this situation--as a consequence of the sharp crisis, and for the situation aggravated for capitalism--that the parties would not lead the masses into the revolutionary struggle, but lead them out of the struggle to a direct or indirect, tacit or open support of the ruling bourgeois teams -- to help the ruling bourgeois teams in this manner to steer the boat of capitalism from the contemporary storm of class struggles--as if in the interest of the nation, fatherland, and so forth. This is also the purpose of their maneuver with the so-called Eurocommunism. Eurocommunism, this fatherless child, fruit of anticommunism foisted upon the West European communist parties, is the expression of a premeditated effort to divide the international communist movement according to geographical areas and other viewpoints, to foment all that could divide the communists, and shatter the workers' class solidarity. In its substance, "Eurocommunism" is a mixture of elements of petty bourgeois reformist theories.

From our experience, very often dearly paid for, particularly of the 1968-69 crisis period, it unambiguously arises that an attack against socialism is always waged as an attack against the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism

and the construction of a party of a new type. And it is waged most ferociously precisely against internationalism, against the alliance with the Soviet Union, against the leading role of the workers class and its revolutionary command—the Communist Party. We know well that the enemy in our country concentrated on smashing the ideological, political, and organizational unity of the party, and particularly of its leadership. He saw this as a prerequisite for realizing his objectives.

Also, the contemporary tactics of the class enemy with so-called Eurocommunism are basically the same. This is understandable. After all, the class enemy is in a difficult situation. The masses of the working people are becoming radicalized. Therefore, it would be good if that role, entrusted by the bourgeoisie to the social democratic parties in the preceding crisis situations, were played also by forces which are pretending to be revolutionary—almost communist, but which in fact tolerate or support the bourgeois rule. The spirit of this was formulated a long time ago (17 January 1924) by the British conservative politician, Churchill: "The socialists will be invited to cure the difficulties of the time under the express condition that they will not use any of the medicines which they favored and in which they believed, and under the threat that if they will reach for these means, they will be immediately dismissed."

How to achieve this? The path has already been well tested: with the help of a gradual revision and abandonment of the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. And one of the principles undoubtedly is internationalism. Therefore one wages such attacks against it.

And, as it sometimes happens, one can find in ones own ranks people who, either out of ignorance, naivete, but also consciously are playing a tune conducted by behind-the-scene imperialist bandleaders. Among those who have come out against internationalism is also Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the Communist Party of Spain, who in a number of speeches and interviews, for example for the Italian newspaper LA STAMPA, declared that the "old internationalism belongs to the past and its fate is to disappear."

However, his efforts to revise Marxism—as is sometimes the case—understandably does not end at one principle. Not only in his book "Eurocommunism and the State," but also in other appearances, including the aforementioned interview, he attacks the Soviet Union, the unity of the communist movement and, in particular, the communist parties of the socialist countries, with whom he finds nothing unifying: "We are considering reorganization of internationalism which would rest on the coordination of our actions with the actions of other workers movements in Western Europe. We could (!) maintain contacts with the state parties in the East, relations of cooperation... there cannot (!) be a common line between the communist parties of the capitalist countries and the state parties of the European East. A global strategy cannot (!) exist." If it is not an issue of setting up a society without the exploitation of man by man, i.e. of setting up socialism, the communists truly cannot have the same global strategy as such groups.

Therefore it is no wonder that Carrillo today rejects also the conclusions of the Berlin consultation of the European communist and workers parties, above all those concerning internationalism. He claims that internationalism is outdated [prezil se] today. The need for internationalism is objective, however. It stems from the development of the production force itself. Production, science, and all social processes are being internationalized today at an unprecedented pace. The bourgeoisie reacts to this by creating supranational institutions of all kinds—beginning with the supranational monopolies, and ending with the so-called European parliament. And in this situation the revolutionary movement should abandon its fundamental unifying principle? Is it not obvious that this can only help the enemy?

No, internationalism today is not outdated. On the contrary, its significance in the new conditions of the unique development of the national liberation movement, of the struggle of nations against neocolonialism and for social liberation is constantly increasing! The development which Europe underwent in the year since the Berlin conference of the communist and workers parties confirmed the absolute correctness of the conference's conclusions, and once again underscored their permanent topicality.

CSO: 2400

WEST GERMAN COMMENT ON CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

Harsher Treatment, Longer Sentences

Bonn DIE WELT in German 16 Jun 77 p 5

[Article by Joachim R. Stern: "Every Year the 'GDR' Intensifies the Punishment for All Who Want To Be Free"]

[Text] Neither the basic treaty nor the subsequent treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the "GDR" nor the final communique of the Helsinki CSCE have brought relief to the people of Central Germany. On the contrary: Legislation directed at illegal emigration from the "GDR" and political dissidence gets steadily more stringent. Paralleling this is the increasing harshness of treatment meted out to political prisoners—and the Bonn Government has not yet protested this treatment.

Triggered by the communist system of terror, injustices are committed against the citizens in the other part of Germany. It seems as if people in the Federal Republic had grown accustomed to such events, so that there is little reaction.

Obviously it has been decided that the Federal Government and most of the mass media should pass over in silence the killings at the wall, the border incidents and the chapter "political prisoners" in the "GDR." For reasons of political opportunism arising from the basic treaty and the subsequent treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the "German Democratic Republic" a zone of silence has been drawn around the inhumane actions of the SED regime and the resulting criminal acts and abuses.

This represents a major change in the attitude of the SPD/FDP Federal Government relating to human rights—no change in that of the "GDR." Within the zone of silence the "GDR" was able to complete that consolidation of its state apparatus, which is needed for the internal reinforcement of the "GDR" rulers by police terror and political law enforcement as the precondition for a power policy based on ideology.

People convicted for political offenses are still behind bars today—just as in the days of Ulbricht and Stalin. They are kept in servitude by the state and treated accordingly. That is demonstrated most blatantly in the matter of freedom of movement which is one of the items in the Basket Three of the Helsinki CSCE agreement. Even before, ever since the basic treaty took effect, the hope of free movement for the "GDR" population was doomed to disappointment. The consequence was a steep rise in sentences imposed on failed refugees and their helpers.

The basis for the persecution of political dissidents and the claim to consider every GDR citizen the property of the state is provided by the new "GDR" StGB [penal code] which, on 1 July 1968, replaced the StEG [penal code amendment]. A somewhat amended version has been in effect since 1 April 1975.

The StEG was the outcome of the new "motives and offenses" defined since the construction of the Berlin Wall, such as "flight from the republic" or, according to article 17 StEG, "forcible border crossing," and the offense called "act of violence threatening the state." The so-called "refugee helper" is also deemed to be a criminal. Initially this was a person providing assistance only with a "passport offense," later though jail sentences were imposed for "inducing another person to leave the GDR" (article 21 StEG).

In 1968 Walter Ulbricht described the new penal code (which was to be in effect permanently) as follows: "Insofar as the penal code of the GDR is concerned, every citizen will be able, by way of the document to hand, to form a clear picture of the nature and content of the republic's socialist penal code. He can see for himself that the penal code and the other pertinent laws serve one goal only: To defend us, the GDR, the socialist achievements of the working people and the peaceful and orderly life of every citizen against all imperialist attacks and other disruptions. Everybody can see for himself that the penal laws of the GDR are permeated by the spirit of justice, true humanity, the protection and observance of the dignity and freedom of man and the principle of the equality of all before the law."

The Sole Aim of Punishment: Socialist Education

The law's mockery of the "GDR" citizen is underlined in particular by the fact that the new StGB includes considerably harsher penalties which were unknown to the StEG. These involve mainly articles 96-111 of the "GDR" StGB, which serve to direct the judiciary to punish offenses against the life and internal security of the "GDR" state. The punishment has one object only: The socialist education of the "criminal." If he is considered "uneducable," he must be isolated from society.

The sentences are therefore much longer. According to the new provisions "anti-state incitement" (article 106 "GDR" StGB) is punished by imprisonment ranging from 105 years, while the StEG provided for no more than 6 months minimum prison sentences.

Following the latest amendments to the law, which took effect on 5 May 1977, the potential punishment for "anti-state incitement" has been advanced to 2-10 years. This more stringent condition applies also to those "GDR" citizens who appeal to organizations in the West after being refused permission to emigrate. Especially affected are "groups and persons who campaign against the GDR" in collaboration with Western groups and organizations. Punishment also threatens the followers of the current civil rights movement.

At the same time the new harsher law includes in the catalog of politically motivated crimes the concept of the "public degradation of state order or of state organs...their operations and measures." Thus the campaign against the implementation of Basket Three before the Belgrade successor conference is now buttressed by law. The crime of "aiding flight" is now, in "particularly flagrant cases" punishable by life imprisonment.

The show trials of refugee helpers did and do show up the problem at the heart of these penal provisions. Article 107 makes the first ever mention of "the formation of groups hostile to the state." "Anyone belonging to a group or organization engaged in actions hostile to the state will be punished by imprisonment of 2-8 years. Anyone establishing a group or organization hostile to the state or organizing its operations will be punished with imprisonment of 3-12 years." Anyone injuring the defensive strength of the socialist "GDR" state or harming the "planned development of the national economy or any of its branches or enterprises, or the fulfillment of the economic plans," may receive the death sentence.

We know that the catalog of the "GDR" StGB does not represent an idle threat. As evidence we have the records of the SED state. Since its inception on 7 October 1949 at least 210 death sentences were pronounced and most of them carried out. As many as 69 people were executed for "crimes against the GDR." After the popular rising of 17 June 1953, for example, at least 20 people were beheaded.

In the course of the years the techniques of interrogation and treatment in prison have changed considerably. In the 1950's serious physical abuse was the norm for obtaining confessions. Now this is used only for the "incorrigible." Instead scientifically refined techniques are applied in order to break the prisoner's inner resistance.

To carry out its investigations the Ministry for State Security retains its own prisons where people are kept pending trial. Those who are suspected of particularly heinous political crimes are held in the central prisons of Berlin-Lichtenberg or Berlin-Hohenschoenhausen.

Categories I and II for Political Prisoners

If anyone breaks the unwritten rule and, after release to the Federal Republic, reports the methods of interrogation practiced, he is immediately slandered. Three former prisoners, for example, said on 12 January 1976, on the

television program "Report," that they had been tortured in prison. Immediately after the "GDR" ADN news agency released the following: "On behalf of the GDR Prosecutor General's office the competent organs of the GDR initiated investigations of three FRG citizens and looked for them on the basis of the arrest warrant issued by the Central Berlin City District Court...It is obvious that such reports are instigated by FRG forces hostile to detente and unwilling to uphold the spirit and letter of the Final Act of Helsinki."

In accordance with the communist principle of the use of different criteria for socialist citizens, the actual penalties in the "GDR" have varied ever since 1964.

Imprisonment then was divided into three categories, "depending on the nature and the seriousness of the crime." Group I includes all political prisoners sentenced to 3 or more years as well as those convicted of very serious common crimes. Group II includes political prisoners sentenced to less than 3 years, usually for passport offenses, counterpropaganda, "vilification" or "slander against the state"; this group also includes common criminals punished with imprisonment not exceeding 5 years. Category III includes all other prisoners sentenced to less than 3 years in prison for various crimes. Political prisoners are never classified in this group.

If a convicted criminal breaks a prison regulation he may, with the approval of the public prosecutor's office, be transferred to a more severe category. No privileges are granted in category I, very few in category II. Prisoners in category III, on the other hand, enjoy considerable advantages such as frequent cinema or television viewings or longer periods of exercise. The amended code of criminal procedure and reintegration law of 19 December 1974 (in effect since 1 April 1975) introduced yet another category to join the earlier divisions (light punishment, general punishment and strict punishment): The new category provides for harsher treatment, to be meted out to persons who attempt unlawfully to leave the "GDR."

One man, deported to the Federal Republic, reports the current reality of the GDR's "humane" penal system: "My name is Helmut G, I am an engineer, aged 40. I was in prison twice. The first time for alleged espionage, alleged 'vilification of the state,' alleged counterpropaganda and as an alleged 'accessory to illegal possession of arms.' The allegations arose from a denunciation. My 4-year sentence was imposed mainly for a poem I had written, glorifying freedom...I was released in the 'GDR' after 3 years. In 1975 I was arrested for trying to flee, sentenced to 18 months in prison, 'bought off' after 10 months and deported to the FRG on 16 June 1976.

Last summer Cottbus jail housed some 500 prisoners, 350-400 of them "politicals." Some 80 percent of these were in prison for attempting to flee or render assistance to refugees, the remainder mainly for 'vilification of the state' and alleged terrorism. The political prisoners included 25-30 physicians...I was refused medical attention (serious circulatory trouble). After

the 14th application I was finally taken to see a physician, but his prescriptions (job change, medication) were disregarded...."

In fact all prisoners are now "productively" employed. In view of the manpower shortage, working prisoners have become a source of profit to the
"GDR" penal system. The annual amounts involved must be calculated in millions. The concept of the reeducation of prisoners by productive work merely serves to hide the truth, which can be described as sheer exploitation.
From this fact arises another, namely that the maintenance of prisoner production postulates a constant supply of prisoners.

The political prisoners are driven to the utmost of their capacity, in the most primitive conditions. Anyone failing to meet his "norm," is punished with the traditional "educational tool" of the communist penal system—hunger. Until he does meet the quota, he must make do with a ration of 10 grams of butter and 15 grams of margarine plus 20 grams of sausage per day and, sometimes, work two successive shifts. If the gap between output and norm is unduly great, the prisoner may "regenerate" his working capacity in 3 weeks of confinement in an unheated and damp punishment cell on a daily ration of 4 slices of bread and a little hot food every third day.

Currently most political prisoners are recruited by conviction for the crimes "fleeing the republic" and "subversive human traffic" (crime of aiding refugees). The simultaneous slander of the Federal Republic has always furnished the real political background to the show trials of refugee helpers. At the 1975/1976 Schubert trial the defendant even asserted that he had had contacts with West Berlin CDU chairman Lorenz.

Bonn's Defensive Tactic: Remaining Silent and Paying

Such trials obviously serve to indicate alleged transgressions of the transit traffic. From 4 June 1972 (when the transit agreement came into effect) to 30 June 1976 the "GDR" arrested 511 people in transit, including 301 West Berliners. As many as 423 were suspected of having been involved in aid to refugees. The Federal Government's reaction to these show trials and arrests is typical for its defensive tactics. It prefers to keep a low profile and consequently loses credibility on all sides.

The Federal Government behaves just as oddly in the matter of "buying off" transactions. The "GDR" thereby obtains quite a considerable source of income and, at the same time, bamboozles the Federal German authorities by inserting criminal elements, thereby discrediting the worth of political prisoners generally. The Federal Government maintains official silence throughout—and keeps on paying. It follows that, since the beginning of detente, the treatment of political prisoners has become even more pitiless and inhumane.

Harassment of Prisoners

Bonn DIE WELT in German 9-10 Jul 77 p 4

[Article by Gerhard Besserer, Berlin: "Ex-Prisoners Report on Harassment in 'GDR' Prisons"]

[Text] Two political prisoners attempted to set fire to themselves in the "GDR" penal institution at Brandenburg. That was reported in Berlin by former fellow prisoners. Both the men, sentenced to many years in jail for attempting to "flee the republic" had tried, on 23 May last but independent of one another, to light floor wax and set fire to the furnishings in their cells. Both suffered from serious smoke inhalation and were taken to the prison hospital. Subsequently they were confined in punishment cells.

At a press conference organized by the "13 August Study Group" the former fellow prisoners ascribed the desperate actions to the notice broadcast on radios in the West, that applications for emigration would in future be considered "basically unlawful" and punished. The prospect of never being able to get out of the "GDR" had triggered the suicide attempts.

The "13th August Study Group" produced documentary proof that human rights were being violated even after the new "GDR" penal code went into effect. The lack of medical care for political prisoners especially gave rise to much concern. The only relief reported was the provision of better visiting facilities and permission to write a letter once a week (instead of once a month).

According to the study group such improvements are offset by longer sentences for attempted flight. As 70 percent of all "political prisoners" are in jail for "fleeing the republic," the draconian penalties must be considered as an attempt to deter.

The documentation also reports on labor camps in the "GDR." In the Fuerstenwalde camp 200 mostly political prisoners are compelled to work three shifts in a tire plant and fulfill 130 percent of the usual norm. Six men are housed in a cell measuring 4 x 2 meters. Ninety persons must share three wash basins. The prisoners feel it a particular hardship not to know where they are going to be sent: "You are carried off in a truck without knowing the destination. Only later do you get to know the name of the camp from fellow prisoners."

11698 CSO: 2300

NATIONAL FORUMS DISCUSS CIVIL DEFENSE WORK

Most Important Tasks of Civil Defense Until 1980

Budapest POLGARI VEDELEM in Hungarian No 6, Jun 77 pp 3-9

[Text] The National Civil Defense Command and the MSZMP Civil Defense Committee recently held a national conference. During the discussions, they evaluated the civil defense tasks implemented between 1974-1976, and also discussed what needs to be done further to develop Hungary's civil defense between 1977-1980.

Lieutenant Colonel Vilmos T. Papp, national deputy staff commander of Civil Defense, said the following about these matters in the opening speech:



Lieutenant Colonel Vilmos T. Papp

The goal of our present conference is that it should give us a realistic, comprehensive evaluation of the Council of Ministers' resolution of 1973 for the further development of civil defense and for the results in the concluding years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Our goal is to discuss fulfillment of the tasks for the first years of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, and to indicate the development tasks for civil defense until 1980. An important part of the evaluation of our work and the determination of the task facing us is the complex system of controls implemented earlier in a planned manner, rendering account of the work by the staff command, the report materials of year-end assemblies of the basic party organizations, this year's session of the Executive Committee of the MSZMP Civil Defense Committee and the Party Executive Committee of the Hungarian Army, where they evaluated the civil defense situation, and we received important guidance in the performance of our further tasks.

Next, Colonel Imre Perger, national deputy staff commander of civil defense spoke and, among other things, said the following:



Colonel Imre Perger

Honored Conference! Dear Comrades!

The present conference is an organic part of the work of our command. Similarly, on 25 January 1974, we evaluated the civil defense situation and discussed the most important tasks of 1974-1975. At this conference, Lieutenant General

Karoly Csemi stated, among other things, the following: "The devoted work of our people has made it possible to continue our work, in a transformed system, under more favorable circumstances and to direct the attention, energies, organizing capability and strength of our civil defense workers to concrete tasks that are evident in this important area of national defense..." In the 3 years that have passed since then, we have made, on the basis of principles and tasks set forth by the Political Committee in its pertinent resolution, significant and successful efforts at developing the civil defense of our country.

In addition to evaluating the period between the present conference and the previous, it is the goal of this conference to discuss the tasks defined in the guidelines of the National Civil Defense Command, to analyze uniformly how to carry them out, and to develop an activist unity.

In recent years we carried out our tasks under basically good foreign and domestic conditions. Despite the detente trends that are constantly becoming stronger in the political sphere, we must see, in the military sphere, that there has been no substantial advance — on account of imperialist maneuvering.

As long as the imperialist countries do not renounce their aggressive policies, the exercise of power politics will lead to wars; as long as the danger of war exists, it will be the arms of the socialist countries, the high level of preparedness for their armies, their national self-defense including civil defense that will secure the self-defense of our countries and the peaceful building work of our people. It is, above all, due to this that Europe has now had 3 decades of peace.

The past 3 years and more have represented an important period, from various aspects, in the development of our civil defense. We have successfully completed the Fourth Five-Year Plan for civil defense and begun carrying out the Fifth Five-Year Plan of the Hungarian Army and civil defense.

Characteristic of the past 3 years, on one hand, was the foundation we laid for long-range development and the carrying out of legal regulations and planning, organizing tasks necessary thereto; and on the other hand, the realization of medium and short-range development and preparation goals on the basis of approved plans.

On the basis of the evaluation by the Military Council of the Ministry of Defense, the Army Executive Committee of the MSZMP, and our own analyses, we may announce that civil defense has solved these tasks successfully.

It is necessary, however, for a clear determination of our further activity by reviewing and analyzing the most important goals of this period we discuss the most important problems in carrying out the tasks set in the guidelines of the National Civil Defense Command.

We have successfully completed one of the biggest tasks of organizational, material-technical development and management affecting the whole of civil defense — the modernization of civil defense special services and self-defense organizations. As a result of this great work, the number of those taken into civil defense organizations declined by about 40 percent, and with this there was a significant improvement in the preparation of special service and self-defense forces, and their provision with material-technical means. The maneuverability of the forces was improved.

Naturally, work of such huge dimensions did not proceed without hitches. Minor deficiencies turned up: excessive emphasis on the self-defense organization, and assignments altered to an unjustifiable extent without taking into account preparation, state of training, and other factors.

The civil defense organization of special services and self-defense meets modern requirements and adjusts to an adequate degree to the possibilities of our economy.

Civil defense has appropriately worked out long-range goals for development tasks, the provision of equipment to special services, and the defense of the workers and population. Accordingly, the time-phased tasks can be targeted in the annual plans and realized. Recently, we have constructed dual-purpose shelters for workers and supplied the population with individual means of defense. The start of these tasks has made it necessary to apply various new methods.

As a result of measures emphasizing economy, we have saved several million forints in the civil defense area. The consistent realization of economy principles has generally had a positive effect on various areas of planning and management. But it appears that in some places, economy is conceived as a campaign. The economy point of view has not become general, a part of everyday work.

We frequently order and acquire means that are of good technical or utilization parameters but in the civil defense area could be replaced by simpler and less expensive solutions. We have also experienced some planning deficiencies whereby we prescribe tasks that are exaggerated and not well considered.

Because of inadequate consideration for the managing point of view and realities, the fulfillment of annual budgets has not been adequate. Thus, for example, the fulfillment of budgetary goals for the ministries and national authorities was 51 percent in 1976 and for the councils 72 percent. But with appropriate attention and careful planning it is possible to achieve good results. This is shown by the example of the Ministry of Domestic Trade, where they fulfilled 95.5 percent of their budgetary tasks in 1976, and the mode of accounting also met goals. Fulfillment at the KGM [Ministry of Metallurgy and Machine Industry] and KPM [Ministry of Traansportation and Postal Affairs] was also about 80 percent. On the other hand, budgetary fulfillment by other organs lagged significantly behind the goals.

A similar situation exists at the council organs, where as a good example of budgetary use we must mention Tolna, Szabolcs, Bacs and Hajdu megyes, but we fault, among others, Veszprem, Heves and Komarom megyes.

Respected Comrades!

The civil defense personnel is characterized by moral-political solidarity and adherence to party policy. Their work is done in this spirit. The party forums of area, plant and military organs at various levels have regularly

evaluated the civil defense situation, its activities and proposals, and with their political education activity and the application of work methods for political mobilization have contributed effectively to consolidating the political-moral situation and implementing the special tasks of civil defense.

The successful activity of the party organizations is promoted, to a great extent, by their orientation in all fields of special work. In possession thereof, they make recommendations to all levels of leadership. These recommendations are regularly accepted and realized. The relationship between party organs and state leaders meets the norms set by the party.

Cadre replacement represents a serious problem in our area. The training of new officers, civilian workers and operational staff commanders will be possible in a reassuring way only after establishment of the Central Training Base makes constant retraining and refresher training possible.

In the sphere of preparation and training, we may say that we have successfully completed the tasks of the Fourth Five-Year Plan and are beginning the preparation of tasks in the Fifth Five-Year Plan. The successful preparation was fittingly shown by the high level of jubilee competitions which set in motion nearly 100,000 persons and evoked nation-wide attention. The importance of the competitions is emphasized by the voluntary work of the participants and the high level of their enthusiasm and consciousness.

We successfully undertook to prepare, by a new method, the population that is not in a work relation through the use of mass communications. These new methods elicited appreciation and great interest both at home and in friendly socialist countries.

The carrying out of training and preparation tasks can be judged as successful. The applied methods and forms were extended, and they became more effective.

But some negative phenomena also appeared. In the personnel forces training of the units, there was too much theory at the cost of practical training. This can be ascribed primarily to the love of ease of the subordinate commanders and the low level of preparedness.

In the field of population and material goods protection, the main task was to work out basic, high-level regulators. We carried out important preparatory tasks for the defense of the population and factory workers, going beyond resettlement, in the area of developments in shelter protection.

An important task was the beginning to provide factory workers with defense means on the basis of a resolution by the National Defense Committee and the approved Fifth Five-Year Plan for civil defense.

From the viewpoint of the future, it is an important fact that planningorganizing work has improved and become more purposeful both at the national and regional commands. Civil defense personnel see clear perspectives in the long and medium range, and also annually, as a result of which there is good awareness of the tasks facing the organization. One-man leadership is being realized, and parallel therewith the consciousness of personal responsibility. The upper and medium level leadership relies on collective opinion to an appropriate extent.

To control and evaluate the civil defense situation, we have introduced a system of command reviews embracing the megyes and ministries. These reviews have proved successful, and in the future we must raise their level and concentrate attention on an examination of the main questions.

In speaking of relations, Colonel Imre Perger said, among other things: Work relations of an appropriate level have developed between the ministries and the PVOP (National Civil Defense Command) which have already had many, important results. In cases, however, the central coordination of some important tasks to assure a unified interpretation and implementation of measures demands a greater than necessary effort. In addition to the deficiencies in our own work, I see the causes thereof in poorly interpreted endeavors at independence in certain ministries. From time to time, measures are delayed, and from time to time they are improperly coordinated, and this causes disturbances in the harmony of activities by subordinates. In respect to civil defense, they rarely use their branch spheres of authority for the factories under their supervision, and accept with difficulty the state measures passed to increase the coordinating responsibility of the area organs.

Our ties with the armed forces have increased significantly. Based on this, we must at every level expand our cooperation with the Ministry of Interior, and particularly with the central and regional organs of the Workers' Guard in the planning and carrying out of the coordination of plans and our common practices.

Our international ties have developed successfully. Two forms of cooperation have been realized. One is general consultation and the other — with the CSSR — cooperation based on international contracts. Our ties are systematic and fruitful. However, the domestic utilization of experiences gained in consultations and the information gained therefrom still leave much to be desired.

After this, the deputy of the National Civil Defense Command spoke of scientific work. He said: With the establishment of the scientific council for civil defense, the preparation of medium and long-range plans and the national conference for discussing the tasks, we took the first steps for the planned start of scientific work in civil defense. The partial plans for certain tasks were readied, but development is slow and the plans are already showing evidence of certain excesses.

Honored Comrades!

The phase, now concluded, which has been under discussion, creates an appropriate basis for quality development. The tasks of 1977-1980 must be solved

essentially under conditions identical with those of the present, or organizational and material conditions that are almost the same, primarily with quality development, the conditions to that end being given.

After this, Colonel Imre Perger extended his remarks to the most important tasks of 1977-1980;

As is well-known to all of you, the Comrade Minister of Defense defined the development tasks of the country's civil defense in the "Guidelines" of the National Civil Defense Command. The "Guidelines" are a basic document of leadership, which serve as the basis in all areas for the evaluation of the civil defense situation, for working out the 5-year and annual plans on development and the necessary orders for carrying them out, and for the constant guidance and control of implementation.

The "Guidelines" determine that the basis of civil defense development in 1976-1980 will be represented by the new National Defense Law and the pertinent party and government decisions.

With the realization of the goals and tasks drawn up in high-level decisions, we must achieve strengthening the overall social character of civil defense as a part of national defense and making defense work in all areas an organic part of the activity of the various organs and managing units.

The level of preparedness must be developed; as a result of unified and coordinated development, the asymmetries and stresses must be reduced; with the optimum use of material-technical possibilities, the level of the defense of life and material goods must be significantly raised.

Last year we started the practical realization of the mentioned goals and of the tasks set forth in the "Guidelines," and with that we provided a basis for carrying out the main tasks for 1977-1980. We have good grounds for looking confidently toward the future. Besides the results outlined in the evaluation, grounds for this are given by the well prepared and welded personnel of the commands, the always devoted vanguard activity of the communists, and the conscious devotion of citizens taken into our special services and self-defense organizations.

In respect to the methods for carrying out the tasks, our main effort in the future must be devoted to the practical implementation of the guidance and control of the tasks. The main area of work is being transferred to spheres of implementation, to the counties, the jarases, the cities, factories, and enterprises.

Respected Comrades!

In the coming period, we must avoid the constant repetition of tasks, and in accordance with the requirements of modern war we must count on repeated blows by the enemy and the disturbing of rescue and release forces activity. In cases, we must round out the tasks by meeting the consequences of natural disasters.

The deputy staff commander of the National Civil Defense Command then discussed the methods and practices under the Fifth Five-Year Plan, and continued: From the above outline, it is evident that the possibility has developed, on the basis of capital city, megye decisions, for the districts, jarases and cities to arrange and conduct exercises in their own spheres of competence.

But I shall call your attention to one important principle. We must avoid burdening the citizens, who carry out civil defense tasks in a dedicated way, with superfluous and unjustified tasks. The other goal is that exercises should be arranged in a more complex and effective manner better approximating the real situation.

In recent times, the defense and fight against natural disasters and industrial catastrophes have come to the forefront of interest in the civil defense organs of socialist countries.

It is an important task of ours to establish the theoretical bases of these problems, building thereon the draft of the necessary principles and plans, the preparation of the civil defense command and forces.

In the field of organizational, material-technical development and management, the completion of our organizational modernization represents the first step. It has created only the foundation of our further work.

The system of material-technical provision of civil defense may be broken down into three main areas:

- for the state budget, including the Ministry of Defense (PVOP), the ministries, the national organs of the highest authorities, and the council organs for budgetary tasks;
- the state enterprises, trusts, cooperatives from their own resources, and
- the population for tasks realizable from their own resources.

I wish to inform you that on the basis of the Fifth Five-Year Plan and the decision of the government, a greater sum is available to us than in the Fourth Five-Year Plan. But this means not only more possibilities but also more responsibilities. We have to make sure that with thoroughly analytical planning and organizing work we use the available material means effectively. For this reason, we need to develop further the unified management outlook in the field of civil defense as well. We must reach a point where every commander, staff commander before every decision will analyze the expected material-financial effects of his decision, the available material-financial conditions, the economic plans and the prescriptions of the Ministry of Defense and staff command of the National Civil Defense Command. I point especially in this matter to the party organs for civil defense and to the special organizations. I call on them to extend help in developing a unified management outlook. In any event, we must within a very short time create order in the management

area. By taking these thoughts into account, we must prepare in the near future for carrying out the newly emerging tasks like, for example, the distribution of special service equipment, the provision of self-defense organizations with equipment items, and the circulation of protective means for the population. We already need to prepare for tasks relating to the preparation of the Sixth Five-Year Plan in civil defense.

The main task of the political work is given by successful implementation of the resolution by the MSZMP Eleventh Congress on national defense. Moreover, we must devote great attention to realizing proposals, and utilizing judgments and experiences voiced at conversations conducted in the exchange of party membership books.

The commander at every level must devote particular attention to improving the discipline situation. Above all, this must be achieved by convincing and planned preparatory work. The best and most effective means thereof is military order and discipline, and formal regulations. This must be assured primarily by personal example and by the levying of consistent and demanding requirements.

At every level we need to strengthen the system of one-person command, increasing the independence of the commands and the staff commands, their sphere of rights and authority, and an accompanying sense of responsibility.

The leadership and guidance of political work must be given an appropriate place in command work, and the turning inward that is evident in some commands at times must be eliminated.

The one-person command system requires full responsibility for political work, which cannot be passed on either to the deputy or the party secretary. We must intensify good, comradely and human relations between leaders and subordinates, and a many-sided thinking about people. Before every decision, the staff commanders must analyze their measures, and arrive at their decision by taking into account the expected political and atmospheric reaction of their order.

We must devote increased attention to the exact implementation of instructions issued in relation to the work of political deputies. In this year, we must prepare and in 1978 we must begin their training. We must attain to where they will become appropriate assistants of the command staff.

We must devote special attention to developing the national defense and civil defense educational work to be carried out among the youth. From the broad inventory of propaganda and education we must with interesting and colorful forms and methods further develop the considerable achievements we have already gained. Above all, we must effectively help the civil defense subunits of the KISZ [Communist Youth Federation] Youth Guard and the Pioneer Guards, and the civil defense preparation being conducted in theframework of national defense instruction in schools. To do this, we have to build up broader and more substantive relations with the regional KISZ and Pioneer organizations.

In conclusion, I am happy to inform the Comrades that the Army Military Committee of the MSZMP has evaluated PVOP activity, expressed its appreciation for the results and developments and offered concrete help in various specific areas.

In discussions on training and preparation, frequent use has been made of the expression, "the new training system." In examining the training tasks, allow me to say in advance that there is no question at all about a "new" system. The "Guidelines" set the tasks as follows: "Civil defense training and preparation must be organized and continued as based on achievements made thus far." Therefore, we need to develop further the considerable achievements of the past training period.

The basic problem of quality development is to develop command knowledge in the civil defense commands, the specialized service commands, the unit commands, and the self-defense organizations. The basics have been imparted in the past training period, and now in developing them further they must be made applicable in leadership, under complicated circumstances, and in the organization and constant maintenance of cooperation and a many-sided security.

In this framework, our goal is to exercise, at an area level, the guidance and leadership of civil defense tasks at least twice in the plan period for a day or two. In addition, we are planning a national multilevel command and staff leadership exercise under PVOP guidance in which the more important ministries, in the sense of the decision by the National Defense Committee, will cooperate with the civil defense commands of the capital city, various megyes, or some of their districts, jarases, cities and several factories.

We want to move substantially ahead in setting up bases serving preparation work. In accordance with our goals, we are developing district and megye training bases. At these facilities, we plan to prepare the commands and staffs. Moreover, we need to perfect methods. In preparation work, we need to break with excessive theory. At group activities, staff exercises and staff leadership exercises, we need to make the commands, the staffs suitable to carrying out the tasks by constantly setting up new situations and accustoming to independence.

An important problem is the preparation of the state and administrative and economic leaders, by their designed activity, for related civil defense tasks.

We must reach a point where in areas of competence every leadership training course of study and in every study plan for council refresher training there will be, in proportion to possibilities, a civil defense subject related to these.

In various megyes, they have already gained positive experiences in this field. Now it is primarily up to the ministries to survey the possibilities and the needs. I believe that with united and coordinated effort we can make it an accepted general rule that there will be no leadership training without the related, necessary civil defense subject.

Building on the achieved results, our most important civil defense training task is to carry out civil defense exercises at the megye, jaras, factory and unit levels. Using the experiences gained in the Third Five-Year Plan, we shall plan, organize and carry out in Tolna and Szolnok megyes, megye-level exercises and in the other megyes of the country jaras, jaras seat, city and capital city district exercises during the Fifth Five-Year Plan period. I do not think it is necessary for me to emphasize the importance of this. We are again coming to the attention of public opinion in the country. This calls for increased responsibility and care from us. The goal of the exercises is to increase organizational preparedness, a ligher level of experience in preparing the defense of the population and carrying out our rescue, release and catastrophe avoidance tasks. I wish to emphasize the demonstration and procedural character of the exercises. There will be an exercise in every megye and the capital city. We must basically plan and organize them so that even command personnel not directly affected by the exercise will, in considering and working up the experiences, acquire the necessary expertise in the planning and organizing of such exercises.

Respected Comrades!

In evaluating the past period, I have emphasized that one of our most important tasks is the effective defense of the population and material goods. Our party and government has set this as our main goal, and it has devoted the bulk of material possibilities to this end. This task is the main mission of civil defense; and politically, therefore, it is also our most important goal.

We have laid the necessary foundation for carrying out the tasks. The bulk of specific work, however, still faces us. These can be briefly summarized as follows:

We must successfully carry out the shelter construction and modernization program planned for peacetime, and we must develop in adequate time the program for the next plan period.

In the area of individual defense for the population and factory workers, the production of gas masks for workers will continue over the coming years at a rate similar to that in 1976.

We shall finish type studies in protective means for infants and children between the age of 1-14 years. On basis of results, we also desire to move ahead in this area. We have started the study and development of antidust masks for the population. We are proceeding with the planning and provision of emergency breathing protection devices which can be made at home to make up for the temporary shortage of apparatuses. We have under development, with the help of the Borsod megye Civil Defense Command and several designated factories, an emergency breathing apparatus for infants and school children in a type range that can be industrially manufactured. After approval of the types, the plans for the emergency protection equipment will be completed with the necessary provision of infants and school children.

In 1977, we began to supply self-defense organizations with protective means and special equipment, in harmony with the supplying of factory workers and special services.

In accordance with our approved plans for the Fifth Five-Year Plan period, we wish to continue in the food industry, food trade, farm and water management, etc., practically to realize preventive radiological, biological and chemical defense [rbv] measures. We have significant material cover available for this purpose.

Thereafter, he analyzed tasks in the field of leadership, guidance, scientific research, and cooperation, and then he continued:

The capital city and megye civil defense commands must improve cooperation with the border organs of the Hungarian Army, the regional Ministry of Interior, the Workers' Guard Command organs; and with appropriately planned and organized efforts it must gain greater validity for the legal sphere of its area coordination and responsibilities.

On basis of practical experiences and problems, it is necessary for the ministries and the civil defense departments, sections, and organs of the highest national authorities to improve, both in national and regional respect, their cooperation with the civil defense command. It is important that they understand and have the subordinates understand that both parties are working toward a common goal, and with coordinated work and united effort they can achieve greater results.

We must devote increased care to the planned carrying out of tasks included in upper-level orders and decisions. We have to increase the role of foresight in preparing for implementation, the prior analysis of expected effects, and the planned nature of implementation, taking into account the volume of the task, the manpower and time requirement and available possibilities. We need to strengthen the complete realization of the central will.

Colonel Imre Perger said these things about the tasks of scientific work:

The approved plans relating to scientific work in civil defense define the goals and limits of the work. This must be filled up with appropriate content. It is very important that the ministries and the highest authorities in their own special fields should take appropriate part in scientific research work, the clarification of theoretical problems and the establishment of scientific bases for practical development tasks. To do this, however, it is necessary for us to understand the importance of scientific research and publication. In our age, science has become a productive power. This development must show up in our area, too. We must reach the point where every important principle and method must be preceded by a scientifically based, manysided study, analyses, practical testing before it is finally introduced. Both in our outlook and practice, we must put this question in a place corresponding to its importance. Without doing so, it is a high-sounding phrase, a ticking off of tasks, and not a productive force of civil defense.

Honored Conference! Dear Comrades!

With the foregoing I intended — without perceiving to be complete — to outline the more important tasks on which we must concentrate our efforts in 1977-1988. In my opinion — with attention to the results achieved thus far — the civil defense personnel is suitable for solving its tasks, it possesses the special knowledge and the practical expertise by which we can attain the goals that are newly becoming evident.

With this, the help extended to the special work of our party organization, our personnel with its decisions and positions can thereby be successfully mobilized for carrying out special tasks, and in accordance with requirements the moral-political profile of the professional and civilian personnel can be strengthened or developed, as well as the working place atmosphere, which is an indispensable precondition of successful work.


In conclusion, I wish to thank you and through all of you the working comrades in the specialized areas and our party organs which help in our work, for your activity until now, and I further ask for your support in attaining the goals that have been set before us and in successfully carrying out our tasks.

The report was followed by follow-up statements and remarks. Lieutenant Colonel Miklos Molnar, in his follow-up, said that the modernization of the special services and the self-defense organizations was carried out successfully and in accordance with centrally defined requirements. The composition of the organization, the material-technical provisions assure substantially better conditions for carrying out the tasks of the civil defense organizations. He emphasized that in the coming years we must prepare the organizations for carrying out rescue-release tasks by building on achieved training results, as well as for collaborating in the restoration of damages deriving from natural disasters and industrial catastrophes.

Dr Ivan Pataky, lieutenant colonel, spoke of his experiences thus far in preparatory work. He emphasized that the activities thus far have served well to realize the goals of unit defense, but we should not leave out of consideration that in certain areas theoretical preparation is stressed at the cost of practical activities. He said that one of the most important — and most significant in its effects — tasks of the Fifth Five-Year Plan period is the holding of civil defense exercises in megyes, jarases, jaras seats, and cities, and moreover the organization and implementation of factory and subunit exercises. In addition, he spoke of the workers duties in differentiated preparation, the results of the training of the population that is not in a work relation in the use of mass means of propaganda, and of the importance of expanding the civil defense knowledge of the learning youth.

Dr Sandor Kovacs, lieutenant colonel, dealt in his statement with the provision of shelter protection for factory workers. He said that for the building of the new dual-purpose shelters important development work was conducted in recent years and in the present plan period. Among these belong the working out of the shelter plans and their types in such a manner that they will meet dual purpose requirements. In addition, he discussed analytically the work of lecturers on population defense. He said that most of them do their work with great dilegence and devotion, and are the most immediate assistants of the jaras and city staff commands.

Lieutenant Colonel Gabor Tokai spoke of the situation regarding individual and rbv protective means. He said that the supplying of special services is in process, and that the supplying of rbv means to the factories' self-defense organizations, to the workers in a work relation, and other strata of the population has begun, or is about to begin. He emphasized that in this plan period — keeping economy in mind — we must first of all solve the problem of breathing apparatuses. He explained that in the field of population defense we have taken only the first steps in individual protection, and therefore in other actions we will have to operate in this area with greater planning.



Colonel Istvan Lestak

After the follow-up statements, many of those making comments told of their regional or central experiences relating to various subjects.

In his summary of the whole day's discussions, Colonel Istvan Lestak, staff commander of the National Civil Defense Command stated:

We have carried out many complicated tasks in the past plan period. The goals set for ourselves we have mostly realized. In the course of our work, we have

encountered concerns and problems. Thus, for example, there are many government decrees available to us, but not in every case and everywhere do they hold these measures in respect as they should everywhere in the world — in Switzerland, the United States and the Soviet Union — the realization of programs for large investments in shelter construction is proceeding at a fast pace. Therefore, we too must devote greater attention to this in the future.

Thereafter, he spoke of the fact that in certain places in the area there were signs of an unjustified bureaucratic outlook. He spoke of the importance of the struggle against increasing bureaucratic features and of the indispensability of an exact solution extending to all tasks. Then he summarized the most important tasks of the future period as follows:

We can begin our present work under the most favorable political—economic circumstances. We can begin realization of goals in support of quality requirements from sound bases; the material conditions for this are assured in the next 5—year plan. We need to study the regional guidelines thoroughly and carefully, for these present tasks which require not central but local initiatives at solutions. In the coming period, we need to devote our main attention to training in wartime activity. This is served by exercises at various levels that are due to come up. But this also requires us to strengthen our civil defense organization to a greater degree and make the command and subordinate personnel capable of performing even under complicated circumstances. We are obliged to do this because of the attitude of the Western world and by the party and government resolutions which help in the realization of our tasks. And these tasks serve to protect the population, human lives and material goods.

Civil Defense Propaganda Work Examined

Budapest POIGARI VEDELEM in Hungarian No 6, Jun 77 pp 10-13

Text Dear Comrades!

The entire activity of our party committee, in accordance with the party conference held in 1975, is directed at effectively promoting, with the instruments of party work, the successful realization of the tasks facing civil defense. As is well known, we are performing this activity with direct and indirect means. Ideological educational work belongs among the indirect means.

Ideological work is an organic part of the educational work expressed among the personnel and is one of the main areas of party work. An important area of ideological work is party and political training and presentational propaganda as a part thereof.

In our areas, party and political training satisfies two requirements: On one hand, the training and refresher training of the cadres; and on the other hand, mass propaganda. Accordingly, party and political training, which is at once a party and a state task, in the field of civil defense is an important part of command leadership of the continuous activity of the party organs and organizations. Its weight and importance is well shown by the fact that it embraces



Lieutenant Colonel Miklos Molnar



Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Pataky

all our personnel, and following the organizations and personnel relations, the number of participants increases from year to year.

Among civilian employees, interest has grown in economic-political problems and the medium level school of Marxism-Leninism. In accordance with the requirements of those interested, mass propaganda courses in recent years have emphasized economic policy, social and political life, and problems of international politics.

The development of these subjects has promoted, and still does, a familiarity with the goals set by the Eleventh Congress of the MSZMP and the Twenty-fifth



Lieutenant Colonel Sandor Kovacs



Lieutenant Colonel Gabor Tokai

Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, and an understanding of domestic and foreign political problems. It is the subject matter of mass propaganda which best shows interest among our personnel has shifted toward economic policy and international politics.

The increase in political education is indicated by the fact that 48 percent of our career personnel have medium or upper level competence, and 52 percent have basic level competence in political studies.

Dear Comrades!

Our ideological work is directed at creating a consciousness of Marxism-Leninism, the only scientific world outlook, and have it accepted as the guiding principle of action.



Colonel Gyorgy Hazai



Colonel Egon Szabo

Experiences from 6 decades of our party's struggle teach us that the development of a socialist consciousness is not a campaign task; in this area there is no place for impatience, compromise and satisfaction with specious results.

The party, political and trade union training have all contributed to making civil defense personnel — primarily communists and career personnel — appropriately understand the domestic and foreign policy guidelines of our party, identify with these firmly, and proceed in the vanguard for fulfilling battle preparedness and speical tasks.

In studying the international situation, it became clear what those springs are which shape the situation of our complicated world. We became convinced that the main strength of our age is formed by the socialist world system, that the policy of detente is the only alternative for assuring the external conditions of building socialism.

Those who took part in the training understood, and they clearly see that

- in the present phase of our development, amid the circumstances of building a developed ocialist society, the basic question is still power; the basic condition for a complete building of socialism is the proletarian dictatorship;
- our party's federation policy is correct, and they agree with it because they know that the creative activity of all the working people is necessary to build socialism. At the same time, many disputed problems arise in this relation; among other things, they do not understand the situation and the role of the small producers in building socialism;
- they are in full agreement with the necessity and timeliness of developing socialist democracy, but in its practical realization there are frequent signs of impatience among the participants;
- they agree with the party's policy on youth and women; they perceive the situation and role of youth and women in our society.

Economic-political questions have evoked great interest among our personnel. This also contributes to the fact that increased interest is evident in economic building work. For career personnel, the present training cycle deals more than formerly with military-political questions; this too appears to have a positive effect.

The public education resolution of our party emphasizes — and we have dealt with this, too, as an important problem in our training — that modern thinking is necessary for modern civil defense, and this promotes the carrying out of educational tasks.

Dear Comrades!

An important role is played in the successful implementation of ideological training by controls, the gathering of experiences, and the generalization of

good experiences. In this connection, as a result of organizing and coordinating activity by the Propaganda Subcommittee, important improvements have occurred during the current training year. Both in respect to numbers and quality, control and assistance activity is proceeding more successfully.

What are the most characteristic experiences in controls?

We can state that the most important characteristic is that during propagandistic work they strive for a high-level realization of substantive requirements and achieving their goals in the given training groups. This they try to assure with thorough preparation and the proper application of methods and means.

The decisive majority of the propagandists prepare themselves for the lectures that start the debates, for the conduct of group conversations and conferences. Some also use visual aids in mass propagand courses to ease the understanding and imparting of the subject discussed. At every level, to the extent possible, they try to collect the literature so that they can successfully use the time allotted for individual study.

It is a good experience that a disposition to discussion exists in the training groups, and the propagandists, in general, make correct use of the methods for stimulating debate. We approve that the propagandists help in preparing the small presentations, give encouragement to raising the more sensitive questions, recognize substantive comments, and do not scold those who make mistakes.

In addition to the positive experiences, the controls have also surfaced procedural and substantive deficiencies. Thus, for example, rather many propagandists in presenting talks adhere strictly to reading the written text, and for that reason they lose contact with the audience and the power of persuasion is reduced.

At some places we have seen an incorrect method whereby, instead of individual study, they hold readings from the study material. It is also an error that at some places they do not give adequate attention to refreshing theoretical questions in connection with a given subject.

At least twice a year, our executive committee puts on the agenda and discusses the situation in party and political training, the tasks and organizational questions of training.

In addition, it directly guides the work of the Agitation and Propaganda Committee, which is responsible for carrying out propaganda work.

The leadership of the basic organizations annually hold two-three discussions on various problems of party and political training. They have a determining role in registration for the Marxism-Leninism Evening University. The propagandists are regularly called on to give an account of the progress in training and of the development of the participants.

The annual assemblies of the basic organizations also discuss the training situation and the tasks. Generally, they pass appropriate resolutions which in their areas promote the development and success of training.

But several deficiencies hinder the attainment of greater results, and their elimination is a current and urgent task facing the leadership of the basic organizations. One problem is that they undertake tasks which should be carried out by the commands. Command tasks, for example, are the following: organization of the training groups, provision of the technical conditions for training, the prepared presence of the students at the activities, dealing with absences, etc. The party organization can help in these matters, but this is not its task.

Another problem is that the basic organizations do not in all cases occupy themselves with the students before registration, particularly at the time of organizing mass communications studies and Marxism-Leninism middle-level school groups.

Successful propaganda work is of great value and importance. The respect and honor it has gained is expressed in the fact that the Central Committee of our party proclaimed April 22, Vladimir Ilits Lenin's birthday, as the propagandist's day.

The propagandists, who perform their work as state and party tasks, always give much more than others, for they perform an activity that requires regular, basic preparation and constant learning. The success of their work is reflected from day to day in the increasing preparation of the personnel, and the constantly higher level of implementation of special and political tasks.

On the basis of all these things, we can establish that the work of the propagandists is an important public activity, and important creative part of the high-level implementation of the tasks facing civil defense.

In the name of our party committee and the civil defense leadership, I express our thanks to the propagandists, and our appreciation for their work. We ask them to continue performing their work with this kind of enthusiasm and love for the cause, to contribute to the successful implementation of the tasks facing party and political training.

Respected Conference! Dear Comrades!

In summary, we may state that according to the experiences gained in the past 3 years, our propaganda work is contributing successfully to the consciousness of our personnel, to the formation of its outlook, and promoting the realization of the tasks that face them. The substance and organization of party and political training basically correspond to political and ideological needs and the interests of the participants.

In the present phase of our development, the growing requirements for the building and defense of a developed socialist society face us with the task of constantly renewing our ideological unity and raising our Marxist-Leninist education to a higher level.

In the future, too, our party's propaganda will be built on the same basis as its entire policy and practical activity: on Marxism-Leninism, on the theoretical implications of our building work, and on the rich experiences of every detail of the international revolutionary movement, above all the Soviet Communist Party established by Lenin.

The resolution of the Central Committee gives particular emphasis among the present substantive tasks of Marxist-Leninist propaganda to the problems of building a developed socialist society, and the problems related to the nature of power and socialist democracy, socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism. These are the three problem clusters which embrace the most timely and important theoretical and practical problems of our party and the international communist movement.

After the report of Gyorgy Hazai, there were comments. A large number of those commenting rounded out the report with area experiences. These opinions at the same time show that the questions raised gave an appropriate sense of the work, the results and the problems of the civil defense propagandists.

Colonel Egon Szabo spoke at the conference on the importance and significance of propaganda work. He emphasized that propaganda work is a proud and very responsible task. In his talk, he stressed that we have to increase the ideological content in the future and strengthen the practical side. He said, however, that in forming people's outlook and in completely solving the things to be done in this work, we cannot build only on the propagandists because this is not a field of specialized work.

Colonel Imre Perger spoke on the responsibilities of political educators. He emphasized that in questions of political education we must begin from the everyday requirements of life, from our own situation, and we cannot narrow this down strictly to study material. He stated that in our days results characterize agitation and propaganda work, and this is the common success of the propagandists, the commanders and the party and trade unions. He spoke appreciatively of those who until now have worked devotedly on the solution of tasks, and on whom great tasks will also fall in the future.

As conclusion to the conference, they gave 20, 15 and 10 year momentoes and awards to workers in the organization and conduct of party and political work.

6691

CSO: 2500

HUNGARY

ARMY PARTY COMMITTEE EVALUATES APPLICATION OF NEW REGULATIONS

Budapest NEPHADSEREG in Hungarian 2 Jul 77 pp 7-8

[Unsigned article: 'Military Discipline and Organization Have Strengthened']

[Text] On 27 June 1977 the People's Army Committee of the MSZMP held an expanded session under the chairmanship of Major General Dezso Papp, first secretary of the party committee. Colonel General Lajos Czinege, minister of defense and member of the Central Committee of the MSZMP, participated in the session. Leading commanders and party political workers of the Ministry of Defense, the army corps, the higher units and institutes attended.

The party committee debated the most important experiences in application of the new Service Regulations. An oral introduction to the agenda was given by Lieutenant General Istvan Olah, chief of staff of the Hungarian People's Army and a member of the Executive Committee.

Following this Major General Dezso Papp briefed the participants on the 22 June 1977 meeting of the Central Committee of the MSZMP.

On the basis of a presentation by Colonel Istvan Pompor, secretary of the party committee, the party committee accepted the evaluation given concerning fulfillment of the first half-year plan for 1977 and approved the second half-year plan; it then co-opted into the ranks of its membership comrades Major General Ferenc Szucs, Colonel Dr Mihaly Berki and Colonel Imre Perger.

The People's Army Committee of the MSZMP reviewed and debated experiences in application of a few important requirements of the new Service Regulations and decided on the following tasks.

1.

The party committee, summing up the experiences, established: -- The new Service Regulations correspond to the needs and to the goals put forward in regard to both content and form of regulation. Their publication and adoption met with interest and active support on the part of broad military

public opinion and the requirements are being realized according to schedule. Realization of the prescriptions of the regulations is also ensured over the long range: maintaining and developing organized military life and activity in a balanced manner and at a high level; strengthening the socialist character and relationships of the army; and strengthening constant battle readiness, order and discipline.

--The level achieved in getting people acquainted with and understanding the regulations has ensured a successful and effective conversion and has laid a foundation for conditions necessary for further steps. It is increasingly characteristic that in making decisions and taking action the commanders do their work starting from the norms of the regulations. The new requirements are increasingly realized in the behavior and especially in the service activity of the personnel. Full realization, however, will require a longer time and continuing, consistent work.

--The basic regulations increasingly fulfill their modern regulatory function. Where necessary in the interest of a uniform order they regulate in detail while elsewhere a more general regulation is realized requiring greater independence, which is in harmony with the requirement for a rational decentralization of powers and rights; they are building on the responsibility and independent activity of commanders and subordinates. They are making possible a flexible and swift adaptation to the dynamism of military life and activity and to local conditions. The commanders understand, accept and in general make correct use of the increased opportunities. With a few exceptions, the greater flexibility has resulted in better organization in the lives of troops, organs and institutes.

--The life and activity of units and subunits is more organized and leadership has improved. A significant role in this was played by the fact that dependency relationships have been consolidated further and the influence of leadership has strengthened. The majority of the commanders are making ever more determined use of their rights and more and more of them are leading by means of brief commands which go to the essence. But there are hindering circumstances in that the development of the degree of organization and planning has not kept pace with the demands formulated by the regulations and that old customs and habits still live and have an effect in views and in practical activity.

--The commanders and the political deputies are making ever more courageous use of the initiatives of the broad masses of the soldiers to develop communal life. Personnel meetings have become the custom and basically they are fulfilling their function and the life of the communities is more evenly balanced. Socialist aspects of relations between superiors and subordinates and among the soldiers have strengthened. Symptoms of impatience, insensitivity and arbitrariness have substantially diminished.

- --The effectiveness of duty tours has increased in that their tasks have been regulated clearly and unambiguously. The dispatcher character of the work of duty tours in units is developing. Planning of, preparation for and supervision of the conduct of duty tours have improved. But preparation is still often routine and it can be found that the guidance and supervision of duty tours are concentrated on external, formal elements of the agenda.
- --The commanders are realizing with ever greater consistency the new norms for caring for subordinates. The quality and level of services offered to the soldiers have improved. In places, however, there are still a number of deficiencies in soldier services; internal order is not uniform and in many places the cleanliness of surroundings is objectionable.
- --The regulations formulated in the interest of protecting the health and physical well-being of subordinates are being applied by commanders correctly and with great circumspection. Secure guarding, storage and maintenance of weapons, ammunition and explosives have improved.
- --The regulations precisely define: the responsibilities and rights of soldiers; the disciplinary rights of superiors; principles and methods of education and prevention work; and procedural rules. This makes a direct contribution to a further strengthening of military discipline; the great majority of the personnel correctly interpret and practice their responsibilities and rights.
- --Purposeful and effective political education work is being done in the interest of making political and movement organs aware of the spirit and significance of the regulations, in the interest of having party and KISZ members give an example and in the interest of developing the views, awareness and public thinking of personnel. Strengthening life, organization, military order and discipline according to the regulations is regarded as an important task. Activity and a critical spirit have strengthened further among party and KISZ members, work and service discipline have improved as has the quality of the execution of professional military tasks and examples are being provided. A higher than average proportion, about 80 percent per year, merit praise and recognition. The number of party and KISZ members disciplined by command action for violations of military order and discipline or service responsibilities shows a decreasing tendency.

An even fuller realization of life and example according to the regulations is influenced negatively by the fact that a unity of words and deeds is lacking in some professional soldiers and party and KISZ members; the level of knowledge and practical readiness are deficient; an incorrect conception of rights and responsibilities can be found; and there are violations of communal norms of service and private life.

In addition to the progress which can be found, some party and KISZ leaders and commanders still rarely initiate public discussion of violations of discipline, rarely make use of the moral educational effect of this

significant forum. The commanders have not made it a general practice to request in time the opinion of party and KISZ organizations or of the appropriate party organs, informing them of the conclusion of disciplinary matters.

2.

In the interest of a more consistent realization of the prescriptions of the regulations the party committee decided on the following tasks:

- --By means of a further development of the continuity and planned nature of work there must be an attempt to make acquaintance with and understanding of the spirit and prescriptions of the regulations more profound and more fundamental, developing a readiness to apply the individual chapters and norms, to analyze and evaluate experiences. Students at the main military schools and at the bases training professional non-commissioned officers should be given information which will better aid fitting into the life of the troops and a more confident application of the spirit and prescriptions of the Service Regulations.
- --Every soldier, without regard to rank or assignment, should be well acquainted with and able to apply in practice in a self-confident manner those fundamental prescriptions of the regulations which regularly arise in the area of everyday life. These are the prescriptions connected with the concept of command, the system of issuing and carrying out orders, the concept of and requirements of military discipline, rules for service relations and carrying out service as well as a perfect understanding of the responsibility, rights and obligations pertaining to a given assignment.
- --Practical application of the regulations and realization of their prescriptions are possible only by means of continuing and profound study. Thus every form of training and further training and the various possibilities offered in the course of everyday life must be exploited more consistently and more purposefully to increase knowledge and make practical preparedness more profound. Greater care must be given to a substantive execution of organized individual study. In the course of further study good experiences must be analyzed and made use of and problems arising in the area of applying the prescriptions of the regulations and the reasons for these problems must be constantly disclosed. After drawing conclusions the necessary measures must be taken.
- --By means of better knowledge of and fuller realization of the regulations there should be an increase in the self-confidence of personnel, an unambiguous strengthening of military relations, order and organization in the strict sense. At the same time they should aid the development of a good atmosphere, the informal lifestyle of personnel, rest, relaxation, recreation and a unity of command strictness and good feeling.

- --Local regulations and the adjustment of supplementary measures to the basic principles and norms must be developed with suitable circumspection. One must keep in mind that local regulations are necessarily changed and modified from time to time as a function of circumstances and tasks and this requires a regular analysis of the situation, timely recognition of new situations and conditions and the flexible and organized carrying out of the necessary refinements and adjustments.
- --Resting on the results achieved in realizing the regulations one must ensure the posing of high level demands and caring for people in all ways; realizing rights and responsibilities in a close unity of their norms; and putting an end to unfavorable phenomena (arbitrariness and crudity).
- --Greater care should be taken that questions really affecting soldiers, officers and non-commissioned officers should come before the communities and forums. Superior commanders and political deputies should offer more effective help to the organizing and guidance work of subordinate commanders in this regard. In the interest of a better balanced and more organized realization of life according to the agenda there must be a more substantive preparation for and guidance and supervision of duty tours of units and subunits and of guard duty and a development of respect for them and of their actual functioning.
- --Greater attention must be given to the cultured appearance and behavior of soldiers outside military bases; there must be determined action against dress which differs from regulations, against violation of the rules of courtesy and against excessive consumption of alcohol.
- --By developing public feeling, mobilizing their membership and giving personal example the party and KISZ organs and organizations should contribute to a fuller and more uniform interpretation of the spirit and prescriptions of the regulations and to strengthening order, organization and discipline. The requirements of the Organizational Regulations must be realized consistently in the work and behavior of communists.
- --The party organizations have a priority obligation to awaken a healthy critical spirit, to encourage communists to take determined action against neglect and errors, and to defend determined behavior which opposed neglect in a principled manner and on the basis of the requirements. They should take care to bring to the surface and to generalize good experiences.
- --Our party organizations should initiate an examination of and a putting on the agenda of questions connected with the development of local policies. Special attention should be given to the political and moral interdependencies of life and order according to the regulations and discipline. In accordance with this they should regularly analyze and evaluate relations between superiors and subordinates and relations among soldiers, and the realization of the requirements concerning how people should be treated and cared for.

- --Our party and KISZ organizations should carefully note that personnel get their pay and allowances regularly. They should take determined action against irresponsibility, unjust demands and arbitrariness, misuse of power and manifestations of crudity.
- --Building on results achieved thus far they should strengthen the link between party political and movement work and the problems and tasks of everyday military life. They should use movement programs and report meetings for a courageous and timely disclosure of deficiencies. KISZ organizations should be brought more actively into cultural activities and the organization of a cultured use of free time. Periodic agitation and propaganda tasks should be increasingly and more directly directed to the solution of actual problems of order and discipline, care and manner of treatment.
- --There should be an attempt in every area of the life of the troops to achieve even more consistently a condition which public opinion identifies with rationality and upright military organization, a condition which the education of young soldiers, the existence of valuable and effective weapons and battle technology and the defense of the socialist homeland require from communists serving in the army.

8984

CSO: 2500

HUNGARY

OFFICER TRAINING AT MILITARY ACADEMIES REVIEWED

Budapest NEPHADSEREG in Hungarian 2 Jul 77 p 11

[Article by Imre Laszlo Ujvari: "Our Officer Training is 30 Years Old--One Line and One Fate"]

[Text] The condition was that I not write about him. He named names, who he started with, he said where they were serving and he spoke of their merits with respect. So we agreed that it would not be a portrait but only a conversation. Memories, comparing the past and the present. But still, to get started, I asked him how he started 30 years ago, in the dawn of the beginning of our officer training. What prompted him, Major General Barna Kazai, to choose a professional military career?

Every Gate Opened Up

"I believe a lot of us came for the same reason," he said without stopping to think. "A good many of the first students of the Kossuth Academy were in the ranks of those who went to the front against the fascists. Workers from the large factories, servants and laborers who had been impoverished only 2 years earlier, students of the people's colleges and many others too answered the call of the party. For example, at that time I was a corporal in the Border Guard. I joined in 1946, barely 17 years old, with an age release. Why? A desire stemming from childhood, mixed with everything else. It may seem like a commonplace today if we speak of how, in those years, every gate was opening before the children of workers and poor peasants but at the time we were dazed with joy. I was hardly even an adult and yet they asked me, the son of a poor peasant: Did I want to be an officer in the people's army? Now, in retrospect, I search for words and cannot say what I felt. If you ask anyone who started then they will say something which more or less corresponds to the truth but the words sound to contemporary ears obscure, a little pat. It was a different age then and you had to be there if you want to characterize it correctly...."

How was it then? Despite his protest let us stick with the career of Comrade Kazai. The request came in the spring of 1947 and by fall he was already a student at the Kossuth Academy. The training planned for 3 years was compressed

into half that time; there was urgent need for young officers who came from the people. After he was commissioned he was assigned to a unit and became commander of an infantry subunit. He worked and made plans. several months he got an order, he was needed elsewhere. A course for field grade officers was being started and he was sent to it as a platoon commander. He hardly got warmed up when a new assignment awaited; he was assigned as a platoon commander to the Dozsa Infantry Officers School. This was followed by assignments to the ministry and then, in 1957, the military academy named for Frunze. He was absent for several years, leaving a wife and two young children. They were difficult years. We note one sentence, a few characteristic words, and then we talk about what was good and full of joy. When we kept digging into the thoughts of that time, the man who did it said: It was hard but it was worth it. He who starts on the path must jump over the ditches and climb the cliffs and go to the end. The sons of the people had to conquer every post in the army and the great majority of the hundreds of officer candidates who started 30 years ago took this mission seriously.

Time and again during the conversation we kept going back to the beginning. What was it like? Today the great majority of the young men starting their academy studies are graduates of secondary schools. Could there have been such a requirement then when the great majority of worker and peasant youth could hardly get as far as the sixth grade? When the liberation opened the gate of opportunity for the oppressed one had to build on what there was. Young people with 6 years of school sat at the same desk with those who had been aided, by their families doing without, to finish the four year civil or other secondary school; together they struggled with the burdens which they had the responsibility to assume as the new possessors of power. I interrogated the general about this road traveled together so that I could give a true picture of that time on the basis of experiences lived through.

Where Are You Going, What Do You Want?

"Must I say now that it was fearfully difficult for a peasant boy with 6 years of schooling to keep up with a fellow student who had completed, let us say, a teacher training course?" Comrade Kazai asked. "Well, I cannot say that. The difference in prior training may seem alarming only according to a contemporary judgment. It was not so then. He who had sworn to become an officer in the people's army was not afraid and shrank from nothing. The fact and the immeasurable responsibility that we had to come up to our vocation ruled out any thought that we might not be able to deal with the task. We felt no difference for two reasons. In the first place those who knew more worked night and day to help those who had to master the basic information at the In the second place there was something in common which washed away the difference in prior training. At that time we did not look at who knew what but rather at where people came from, where they were going and, primarily, what they wanted! We knew that the missing information could be made up, it was only a question of time, who would get how high on the parapets of knowledge, but we absorbed with our mother's milk the feeling of belonging together as men with a common fate. Today when a student asks to be discharged because he did not imagine an officer's career to be thus or so I remember that only those left the Kossuth Academy who were sent or who became unfit for the vocation of officer. We really started in the spirit of the marching song, 'to turn over the entire world.'"

The question presented itself: What is the difference between officer training then and under present circumstances?

"It would be difficult to even sketch an aswer in so brief a conversation," said the commander of the Lajos Kossuth Military Academy. "Training today is at a much higher level. This is understandable too. It is enough only to think what sort of weapons and technical equipment there were in the army then and what they are like today. Training lasts 4 years and the students are secondary school graduates. Personnel and material conditions are incomparably better today than even 10 years ago. If I add that the young officer graduates with an engineering or teaching degree then I have answered the essence of the question....But our old and present officer training are similar in some respects nevertheless. They are similar primarily in that then as now there is a maximum provision of conditions for training the students. There were well equipped shops and classrooms for the students at the Kossuth Academy too. For example, the Academy got the first T-34's. And if we stick with making comparisons I can say that a practical character always characterized our officer training. We left the Kossuth Academy as commanders or teachers for a month and a half and lived in camps and tents. Remembering this I can say that we had well organized and directed exercises which really taught us what the troops expected from us. This practical training runs through all our officer training. It is this way today too."

Education for Life With the Troops

"Can we say that training has been suited to the needs completely? At every conference at which troop commanders speak they urge even more practical officer training. Such demands are also made by young officers who graduated a few years ago when they say that they had a lot to learn upon joining the troops."

"Let us take these in order. When we started the majority came to the Kossuth Academy from the troops. Later the students in the branch of service officers' schools served a preliminary year or year and a half with the troops. This was also the practice at the time of the United Officers' School. Such a requirement has not been decreased at the military academy either; indeed, the situation is better now. In general practical instruction makes up 60 percent of the instruction, reaching 70 percent in military subjects. In his 4 years each academy student spends 9 months with the troops. Substantively this is worth more than any earlier practice for a fourth year student goes to the troops with serious theoretical and, in part, practical information. A warrant officer or staff warrant officer already has a command viewpoint. Some of them, during practical troop service, guide the life of a platoon or even a company. Recently we have also been taking care that

graduating students spend their last practical tour with that unit to which they will be assigned after receiving their commissions. They are there during basic training of recruits and when the unit is on tactical maneuvers.... Practical training also includes the fact that for 4 years the students practice everything which they or their soldier subordinates will have to do. The squad commanders get up at a quarter to five and every student gets up 10 minutes later; taps is at 2200 hours in the evening. They get the same 24 hour duty assignments as they will be given or have to direct in a unit. To make you understand the load I might say that 90 students per day go on 24 hour duty, the same number going off. Even the mess schedule is the same as with the troops....When I say that training for troop life at the academy is more conscious than ever before I should add that we await and pay much attention to all observations and recommendations of the troops. final analysis every bit of our work must be adjusted to the requirements of the troops for officers beginning their careers must be well prepared for this work in every respect. But we must warn that the freshly commissioned officer is not yet a completely finished commander. He does not have that experience which officers have who have been working for several years or longer. They must be helped to get this experience."

It has been our experience that the older officers receive those beginning their careers with love and without misgivings. As Comrade Kazai himself said the students returning from practical troop service arrive with ever fewer complaints. Those who started 30 years ago got their experience at the expense of trouble and suffering. At that time the regimental commander may have had a star on his shoulder board but he was just as much a beginner in command work as the platoon commander. It was quite natural then for officers to be in the barracks from early dawn to late at night. Requirements appear differently now. What is crucial is not the time spent but the intensity. Life flows more intently, with more tensions. Modern weapons have not only increased the tempo of attack, they affect every area of a soldier's life. It is not by chance that in many respects the officers of the 1950's were compared to workers in heavy industry while today engineering is the basis for comparison.

"Those who started 30 years ago and those starting today are similar in their integrity too," Major General Barna Kazai emphasized. And the situation is repeating itself today where freshly commissioned officers are leading companies or batteries right away or after a few months troop service. They are solving their multiplex and difficult task with understanding and responsibility and, like those who started in earlier years, at the price of self-sacrifice.

"In this respect the officers are all uniform," the general said. "The experience of the older ones mixes with the enthusiasm and higher level of theoretical training of the young ones. Those who graduated from the old Kossuth Academy are slowly but finally giving their places to the mature army which fell in behind them, to educate our soldier youth for faithful service to the homeland and the people."

8984

CSO: 2500

AIRLINE SERVICE, FACILITIES TO BE EXPANDED

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 20 Jul 77 p 3

[Article by Zoltan Gyulai: "Air Traffic"]

[Text] Matyasfold--Technical University Quays--Budaors--Ferihegy. are the stages of our air traffic development. Next year will be the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Hungarian civil air traffic: the first scheduled air mail service left Budapest for Vienna on 4 July 1918. MALERT, the Hungarian Air Transportation Company, was formed in 1923; the planes landed at Matyasfold Airport, while seaplanes set down on the Danube's water in front of the Technical University. Scheduled domestic and international air traffic restarted in 1930 again. Four years later the Budaors airport was dedicated to traffic -- but its location and microclimate proved unfavorable. Therefore in 1939 construction began on Ferihegy. airport, dedicated in 1950, was Central Europe's most modern sky harbor at the time. After World War II, on 29 March 1946--still in Budaors--the Hungarian-Soviet joint air enterprise: MASZOVLET [Hungarian-Soviet Civilian Airline | came into existence: scheduled traffic began gradually between 10 of our major cities and Budapest. Two years later, Hungarian planes were flying to Prague, Bratislava, Warsaw, Bucharest and Belgrade. The enterprise was reorganized in 1954: MALEV [Hungarian Air Transport Enterprise] was created.

Ferihegy

All this is in the past. Present numerical data are witness to impressive growth. In the last 10 years, air traffic almost doubled at Ferihegy: The number of planes landing and taking off at the airport increased from 17,000 to 31,000, and the number traveling through the country's airspace increased almost 2 1/2 times, from 35,000 to 83,000, and, even more important, this year, it is expected to reach 100,000. This amount of increase in traffic makes reconstruction of the Ferihegy International Airport unavoidably necessary today, as a major national investment. Decision regarding this was made 2 years ago, and last year the complete development concept was accepted for the period extending to 1990, and, recently, the first part of this major investment was worked out and will be implemented between 1977 and 1982. After

conclusion of the job, Ferihegy will be a Class I international airport and will comply with the strictest international requirements, the ICAO and CEMA standards. Instrument control will make traffic safer, and the modern hangar and technical bases will create the opportunity to prepare the planes technically better.

The Air Traffic and Airport Authority will coordinate the work between the general planning work by UVATERV [Road and Railroad Planning Enterprise], the Public Road Investment Enterprise—which will handle the investment—the Concrete Road Construction Enterprise—which will be the general contractor—the National Construction Industries Enterprise No 21, the VAV factory [Electric Powerstation Engineering Enterprise] of the Electrical Equipment and Apparatus Works and the Public Works and Deep Construction Enterprise. The investment is planned at 4.5 billion forints; 2.5 billion of this will be carried out during the present plan period.

Investments

First of all, a new runway 3.7 km long will be built, together with supporting facilities and taxiways. Primarily, the increase in traffic makes this development unpostponable, but it is also necessary in order that, after it is completed, the nearly 30-years-old present runway may be closed down for a year. Modernization of the present runway is unavoidable: Not only resurfacing is being considered, as before; the runway's understructure must be strengthened, light technology equipment will be built into its longitudinal axis, and rain drainage problems will also be solved. Of course, the new runway will be better, also, from the viewpoint of noise pollution, because noise made by the planes will not be concentrated in one area: After rejuvenation of the old runway, traffic will be distributed between the two runways.

Another fundamental task of stage one is the construction of a two-bay maintenance hangar and technical base and construction of a loading apron. The last planes which could be put completely into the present hangar were the IL-14s, but MALEV's present planes cannot. It cannot go on much longer like this, particularly because in the next decade we must expect even larger planes than the present ones, the size and category of the IL-62s. MALEV's concept for maintenance of its planes is a correct one: We are having only major overhauls and jet engine repairs done in the Soviet Union; other required work, the so-called hourly maintenance, is done here at home.

Construction of the instrument flying control system, which will cover the entire country, is already under way. Long-range radar, surveying the country's western air space and air corridors, is operational on Korishegy, and equipment in Puspokladany is now being calibrated, which will serve the country's eastern areas. Direction-signaling radio transmitters for the air corridors have been operating for years. The airport's Category I landing instruments make landings and takeoffs possible now if visibility is at least 800 meters horizontally and 60 meters vertically, but, after modernizations currently under way are completed, these numbers will be cut in half,

and [the equipment] will suffice for Category II operation. But since our country has no alternate airports, the new runway will be equipped with Category III equipment, with which planes can land with 200 meters of horizontal visibility and zero meters of cloud base. Thus, landings and takeoffs will become virtually independent of the weather.

MALEV

Ferihegy is home base for the domestic air enterprise, MALEV, but MALEV is not just one of many user firms: Almost half of the traffic are domestic planes. Numerically, there are 7 TU-134s, 6 TU-154s and 5 IL-18s. By the end of the decade, the plane park will increase by two each of the TU-134s and TU-154s. Scheduled flights to Rijeka and Barcelona also began this year, and there are plans for Hungarian planes to fly to Bagdad, Thessaloniki, and also Bombay by the end of this decade. Scheduled traffic will increase by 88.6 percent during the present plan period, and the number of flights will be 7,612 by 1980. The IL-18s serve mostly the Hungarian agriculture's export; the planned increase in performance of merchandise transportation performance—in merchandise ton-kilometers—is 350 percent.

But growth of traffic can only be achieved through improvement of flight safety and of on-schedule performance. Suitable schedules must be worked out for optimum utilization of the TU-154s. In the long range it must also be taken into consideration that life expectancy of the IL-18s will run out during the next decade, but they have already been taken out of scheduled passenger traffic. And if more intensive utilization of the TU-154s will also be solved successfully, the ones which started to work in 1973 will also retire in 1990. In the last year of the 5-year plan period, MALEV will transport over 800,000 passengers—almost double of 1975—and over 17,000 tons of goods. The number of kilometers flown will increase from 12 million to 24 million between 1975 and 1980.

The long-range development plan is determined by tasks defined in the transportation policy concept, and during the 80's we must also enter the overseas traffic market at any cost. Considering the distance between Budapest and North America, and using two flights per week for calculation, we would be flying about 125 million passenger kilometers, which is about one-fourth of MALEV's 1975 performance. Thus it can be understood that according to preliminary indications, the performance of Hungarian airplanes will increase by 480 percent in 15 years, to a total of 2.9 billion passenger kilometers.

8584

CSO: 2500

POLICIES OF NEW PRC REGIME CRITICIZED

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ POLSKI in Polish No. 27, 3 Jun 77 p 5

[Article by Stanislaw Dymek: "Peking in the Old Entrenchments"]

[Text] The vogue concerning travel to Peking has remained, for years, one of the most reactionary policies of the NATO countries. For some of them it is the path to gaining publicity, others are traveling there in the capacity of Cold War pilgrims, and all of them are fulfilling, consciously or unconsciously, the role of heralds of Peking propagandist theses. The leaders of the West German Christian Democratic opposition show particular zeal in this area; for example, Franz Josef Strauss has already "credited" himself with several trips to China, each time giving a show of "total concordance of views" with his hosts.

Recently, during the first half of April of this year, another representative of the right-wing CDU/CSU, Hans Filbinger, minister-president of the government of Baden-Wurttemberg, was solemnly feted in Peking. During the occasional exchange of toasts, words well-known elsewhere were spoken. The guest was so kind as to state that the results of Helsinki were "disappointing," and the hosts reciprocated with the declaration that they supported the "unification of the German nation," or the claims of West German reaction to the absorption of the GDR.

We are writing about these displays of fraternization in order to show that the suppositions expressed here and there to the effect that the new Chinese leadership which, indeed, is facing many complex, unusually difficult internal problems will demonstrate some larger measure of realism in its foreign policy have not been confirmed in practice. As a matter of fact, a certain change in the style and tone of official Chinese pronouncements could be observed at one time, but it soon turned out that this was only a manifestation of the lack of concordance of views in the Peking leadership. Together with the progressing political stabilization in the PRC, there has been a renewed increased in diplomatic activity and an intensification of propagandist activity in a spirit of hostility towards the USSR, as well as towards the other socialist countries. The old slogans on the subject of "the two superpowers," "hegemony," "inevitable war," and "the great confusion

in the world" continue to be used. The thesis on the subject of "the threat from the polar bear" continues to be put forth, as follows, among other things, from the utterance made by Filbinger, whom we mentioned. This recurrence (although it would be feasible to speak instead of a continuation) of anti-Soviet feeling is observed with undisguised satisfaction in the capitalist West. Recently, in THE TIMES of London and the American THE NEW YORK TIMES, there appared nearly identical commentaries pointing out the alleged "impossibility" of a Soviet-Chinese rapprochement, and urging the exploitation of this situation. The article published in the New York daily was based upon an interview with "a responsible person in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China." Was it really with a "responsible" person?

The convergence of the foreign policy of Peking with the doctrinal assumptions of the United States was also made apparent recently, in a more concrete manner. For example, the campaign of the American government on behalf of "dissidents" in the socialist countries gained Peking's full support. The West's outcry over the alleged "intervention of Angola and Cuba in the internal affairs of Zaire" also found a favorable echo in the Chinese capital; military aid for the corrupt regime in Kinshasa followed in its wake. With the same eagerness, Chinese propaganda adopted revisionist, anti-Soviet theses, launched in Japan by some circles, on the "matter of the four islands," thereby attacking the decision of the government of the USSR with regard to the restricted fishing zone along the coast of eastern Siberia. All of this demonstrates that, in the field of foreign policy, Peking remains in the old, continuously fortified entrenchment of anti-Soviet policy and great power chauvinism, a circumstance which is reflected in China's inimical attitude towards the idea of detente, the principles of the CSCE, and the disarmament talks.

Moreover, nothing has changed in essence in the internal policy of the Maoists, despite bitter and rather tasteless criticism of the Gang of Four. Everything indicates that divergences continue to exist in the leadership of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], and the contests for succession have not yet been concluded. The fact that mahy posts in the government and the directing bodies of the party remain unfilled substantiates this view. Many contradictory statements have been made on the matter of the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-p'ing. A definitive line in economic matters has not been established, despite the convocation of two all-China conferences—agricultural and industrial—at which much was said about the necessity for following the examples of the Tachai farming crew and the mining labor forces of the Ta-Ch'ing district.

The Chinese economy has been experiencing a period of stagnation for many years; and some sectors, such as the steel industry, for example, have recorded a decline in production recently. Workers' wages have remained at an unchanged level for more than a decade, there is a shortage of many goods, and quite a few others including cotton materials, are subject to strict reallotment. Together with the effects of the earthquake, the Gang of Four is saddled with responsibility for these difficulties, although quite a

few of the slogans preached by them continue to be used. The newspaper PEOPLE's DAILY published an article on 11 April 1977 containing "the eight newest teachings," in which, to be sure, the need to introduce "great order" is mentioned, but in which familiar slogans from the days of the Cultural Revolution can also be found. The "teachings" are supported by a quotation from the writings of Mao: "Stabilization and union do not signify renunciation of the class struggle; the class struggle constitutes the decisive link, and all the rest depends upon it."

It follows from this that all the speculations of the Western press on the subject of "gradual de-Maoization" have no basis in fact. It is worth adding here that the recent anniversary of the birth of Mao Tse-tung was celebrated with a repeated publication of his speech of April, 1956, which initiated a turning point in CCP policy known as "the new general line," and represented a denunciation of the accomplishment of the Great Leap Forward, (a maneuver which has done the Chinese economy irreparable damage) as well as of the formation of people's communes. At the same time, this occurrence afforded an opportunity for the initiation of the anti-Soviet compaign, which continues to this day. The fifth volume of "The Selected Works" of Mao, published in the middle of April, has also been given a character hostile to the USSR and the other socialist countries through the tendentious selection of texts. It should be noted here that Hua Kuo-feng, the present charman of the party, heads the publishing committee.

In this situation, the most visible change in China is the rehabilitation of many well-known party workers and military commanders who were bitterly attacked during "Cultural Revolution, such as Ch'en Yi, Chu Te, and Ho Lung. Also, more is being written at the present time about the contributions of Chou En-lai, focusing on his interest in economic matters. Blame for the former veiled criticism directed at him is being placed on the members of Chiang Ch'ing's gang. The matter of the dismissal of Teng Hsiao-p'ing has been considered in the same way, although it is generally understood that the removal of this pragmatic politician came about at the suggestion of the late chairman of the CCP.

Incidentally, the condemnation of the Gang of Four is continually taking astonishing forms. There is no need to recall what has been written on this subject in ta-tzu-pao (big character posters) and in the Peking press, since we are not conducting deliberations on the Chinese polemical style. It is sufficient to note the results of the official investigation, which were published recently in the form of an article entitled "The Black Gang, a Bloc of Old and New Counterrevolutionaries." It is maintained in this article that Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, the former vice premier, was "a spy of the Juomintang" (Chiang Kaishek's party) who joined the CCP for purposes of sabotage. It is further said that Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, who was admitted into the party "thanks to the recommendation of the spy," was also supposed to serve Chiang Kai-shek's followers. The third member of the gang, Yao Wen-Yuan, in turn, was designated as "an alien element with regard to class," it being held that he was "the son of a capitalist, a landowner, and a spy" and, at

the same time, "the protege of the chief of the spy network of the Kuomintang." The youngest member of the foursome, Wang Hung-wen, who could not have served Chiang Kai-shek because of age, was officially recognized as a "bourgeois" who had a "showy way of life and surrounded himself with class enemies." Let us add to these characteristics: until recently, all of these people were members of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was, moreover, the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Chinese army, Wang Hung-wen was vice chairman of the party, and Yao Wen-yuan exercised control over the entire propaganda apparatus in China. It now appears that China is going through an unquestionably difficult period, irrespective of what is taking place in the leadership or what the Peking press is writing on the subject of the damage done by the gang. In the final analysis, the Chinese people, numbering in the many hundred millions, to whom all the doctrinal disputes and personal struggles at the top are surely altogether alien, are suffering the most as the result of unsound policy, confusion in the economy, and preparations for an inevitable war. Therefore, what China needs is not one or another modification of the assumptions of Maoism and the notorious Cultural Revolution, but a realistic economic policy consistent with the needs of society. No doubt the present leadership is attempting to aspire to more flexible methods of action, but it is doing so primarily with a view towards consolidating its own position. The revival of old slogans and the lingering spectacle of the struggle for authority are met with ever diminishing interest among the broad masses, as is attested to by the many demonstrations of discontent and even actions against the authorities.

"It would appear that now, after the four-member gang accused of desiring the institution of a fascist dictatorship and betraying the interests of the Chinese people has been overthrown, logic ought to lead to the conclusion concerning the necessity of a renunciation of the policy maintained by this gang, consistent with China's national interests," wrote Moscow's PRAVDA recently, with irrefutable legitimacy. "But this has not happened," it continued.

What next, then? We do not know the answer to that question; it remains for us only to believe that good sense and understanding of the interests of the Chinese people themselves will prevail in China in the end, and that these very premises will determine the direction of Peking's foreign policy. If not today, then perhaps tomorrow.

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